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Preface
Plato (IV century b.c.) recognised the public relevance of children’s welfare in the
book VII of “The Laws”, stating:
“...there shall be compulsory education, as the saying is, of all and
sundry, as far as this is possible; and the pupils shall be regarded as
belonging to the state rather than to their parents..”
The present study considers how a government concerned with the welfare of
its children can measure it while taking into account that children live in families.
The household is the primary collective to which a child belongs, and a government
should know the household’s behaviour to design policies supporting single members
of this collective. The thesis proposes to econometrically evaluate various aspects of
children’s welfare in Albania and how they are affected by public policies. The idea
is to analyse the welfare of children (both in monetary terms and with more compre-
hensive indicators of wellbeing), taking into account the intra-household distribution
of resources and decision making. The work is organised as follows.
Chapter I outlines the theoretical backgrounds of the analyses and includes a
brief overview of Albania’s economy and its peculiarities, the condition of house-
holds and children in the country and the weak policy measures supporting poor
families and children. Chapter II presents an assessment of the only anti-poverty
program implemented in Albania. Its capacity to reach families who are effectively
in need (targeting evaluation) and its impact on family welfare (treatment effects)
are estimated.
The unitary framework is dropped in Chapter III, which explores child welfare
proposing and estimating a structural model of household collective consumption.
The analysis focusses on children aged under five, for whom the consumption sharing
rule can be consistently estimated. After having assessed individual welfare and
poverty incidence for this cohort through a collective demand system, the chapter
shows how cash and in-kind transfers influence child welfare in Albania using non-
parametric techniques.
Finally, Chapter IV investigates the long-term effects of parental migration abroad
on the welfare of children left behind in Albania. Although parent migration usu-
ally benefits children economically, the lack of parental care can cause relational and
psychological problems that may affect children’s welfare in the long term through
a negative effect on their educational attainment. The phenomenon of children left
behind - mainly by fathers - is particularly significant in Albania, where migration
has represented the only viable way of coping with increasing poverty and the ab-
sence of public resources sustaining household income. The work takes advantage of
retrospective information on migration, which enables the reconstruction of the “left
behind” episodes of children in their parents’ migration history.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This introductory chapter has two goals. The first is to introduce the issue of mea-
surement of child welfare. The second is to provide a general description of the
country that will be analysed in the three essays of the thesis, Albania.
When dealing with child welfare, the problem of the inadequacy of the standard
analytical tools for studying intra-household inequality has to be faced. Perhaps the
most appealing framework to deal with these aspects is that of collective models. This
framework permits to focus on individual welfare of households’ members, taking into
account the allocation of resources within the family, improving the potentiality of
poverty and inequality analyses, as well as the evaluation of the impact of public
policies on child welfare. The first part of this chapter deals with these issues, as
they represent the theoretical background of the three essays presented in the rest
of the study.
The last part of this chapter gives a general description of this not-often-studied
country, Albania, with a special attention to the evolution of the role of the family
and the condition of vulnerable members during the years of the transition to a
market economy. The description of Albanian households with respect to poverty,
inequality and public policies, offers a reference framework to the analysis of child
welfare.
1.1 Measuring the welfare of children
This section introduces the theoretical backgrounds of the essays presented in the
next three chapters of the thesis. Section 1.1.1 presents the theoretical foundations
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for the program evaluation performed in Chapter II, Section 1.1.2 introduces the
collective household framework developed in Chapter III and Section 1.1.3 presents
the theory supporting school attendance models estimated in Chapter IV.
1.1.1 The measurement of welfare
It is common practice in the evaluation of household welfare to start with the identifi-
cation of a single monetary indicator of welfare, a money-metric measure of the living
standards of individuals. This indicator is generally identified with total household
expenditure on consumption or income. This measure finds its foundation in con-
sumption theory (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a), where agents maximise a utility
function subject to a budget constraint,
maxu(x) s.t. p′x = y, (1.1)
which determines the optimal consumption choices of the individuals, x∗i (p, y). In
this programme, x is a vector of consumed goods, u(x) is the utility function rep-
resenting consumption preferences, p is the vector of prices of goods x, and y is
total expenditure. x∗(p, y) is the demand function obtained by the maximisation
of programme (1.1) and depends upon prices and total expenditure. According to
this approach, the natural measure of welfare would be the utility function evalu-
ated at the chosen consumption bundle V (p, y) = u(x∗(p, y)), which is also known
as the indirect utility function. However, it can be proved that the expenditure
function e(p, U), which determines the minimum possible expenditure to attain the
utility level U , can be used as well, as it comes from the dual consumer problem
(min p′x s.t. u(x) = U). Indeed, given a price vector p, the expenditure function
works as a representation of preferences, as it monotonically increases with utility
U (Diewert, 1974). Considering that for any consumption bundle x the utility of
consumer is u(x), the corresponding value of the expenditure function is
e(p, u(x)) = m(p,x), (1.2)
where m(p,x) is called the money-metric utility of x, given prices p (Samuelson,
1974) and represents the minimum expenditure to reach the utility level attained at
x. Considering that each observed bundle in the real data should be the result of a
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maximisation problem, the utility function equals the indirect utility:
u(x) = u(x∗(p, y)) = V (p, y), (1.3)
and it is possible to define an alternative money-metric measure of welfare as
e(pr, V (p, y)) = µ(pr; p, y), (1.4)
which is called the indirect money-metric utility or equivalent income (King, 1983).
This is the minimum expenditure sufficient to reach utility V (p, y) given a vector
of reference prices pr. When the reference prices pr is equal to the observed prices
p, then µ(p; p, y) = y, implying that total expenditure in consumption is a proper
measure of welfare, assuming that observed consumption choices are optimal in the
sense that they maximise consumer’s utility.
This framework is widely used to perform public policies evaluations. For ex-
ample, if a reform applies a reduction of income tax rates, total expenditure in
consumption will reflect this change increasing from y to y1, and the welfare increase
due to the reform can be measured simply as y1−y or, in relative terms, as (y1−y)/y
(assuming that prices are unchanged). An alternative policy reform may affect value-
added tax rates, increasing prices from p to p1. Such a reform can be evaluated by
means of the Equivalent Variation (EV) welfare measure, i.e.,
EV = µ(p; p1, y)− y, (1.5)
where the first term of the equation is the equivalent income computed at the new
price levels p1, assuming that total expenditure remains unchanged. Clearly, a policy
reform could simultaneously change total expenditure and prices, such that
EV = µ(p; p1, y1)− y. (1.6)
Alternative measures of welfare variations can be constructed by choosing a dif-
ferent reference price vector (if the reference vector is the post reform p1 the measure
is called compensating variation) or by using an alternative welfare measure as the
money-metric utility m(p,x), useful when the public intervention directly affects
consumed quantities of some goods.
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In order to use the presented framework for poverty and inequality analysis, a fur-
ther assumption is needed. Consumption data are always collected at the household
level. Hence, it is necessary to assume that within the family resources are optimally
allocated according to the needs of its members. In this way, consumer theory, which
is developed to explain the behaviour of an individual, can be applied to household
consumption, as the marginal effect of income and prices changes will be the same
for all household members. However, households are not identical and several factors
can influence the welfare of its members. For instance, the most-studied factors are
family composition and household size. Given a certain consumption level, individu-
als belonging to larger families will have a smaller welfare level with respect to small
households, even if this effect can be reduced by household economies of scale. To
solve this problem, a common practice consists in computing per capita or equivalent
consumption, such that the welfare measure becomes comparable across households
of different sizes.
In Chapter II, this analytical framework is used to measure the impact of an
anti-poverty programme on household welfare and poverty in Albania. However,
this approach may not be fully satisfactory if the aim of the analysis is child welfare,
as shown in the next sub-section. Let us see why.
1.1.2 Why the standard approach cannot be applied to children?
In the household model of Becker (1974, 1981), the unitary and altruistic nature
of the family implies that even if there is a change in individual variables, there
may not be a change in household consumption patterns and the distribution of
resources. Becker has attempted to reconcile the single-utility (or unitary) framework
with the collective nature of the family by introducing the “rotten kid” theorem,
stating that family members, even if they are selfish, will act to help one another
if their financial incentives are properly linked. Later, Sen (1983) has introduced
the issue of gender inequality within the household, suggesting that resources may
not be equally distributed according to members’ needs. Following Sen’s concern,
during the 80s there has been an increasing attention on the issue of intra-household
inequality (Behrman, 1988; Sen, 1988; Haddad and Kanbur, 1990; Harriss, 1990;
Thomas, 1990; Behrman, 1992). This effort has culminated with the seminal works of
Chiappori (1988, 1992), which, introducing the collective household models, started
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a new stream of research on intra-household resource allocation. In these models,
household’s choices are grounded on individual preferences for each member - more
frequently, the adults - and the family’s choices are regarded as the result of a decision
process, which may involve bargaining among the members. The main assumption of
this approach is that household decisions are Pareto efficient, in the sense that, for a
given choice, it is not possible to increase one member’s welfare without reducing that
of the others. Later, the results of Browning et al. (1994) opened the way for welfare
comparisons of households with different composition using expenditure data and,
hence, welfare comparisons with individual-based rather than family-based welfare
measures. They show that maximising the household problem
maxUa(xa) + ρU b(xb) s.t. p′(xa + xb) = y, (1.7)
where ρ represents the relative weight of member b, is equivalent to separately max-
imise individual utilities
maxUk(xk) s.t. pkxk = φk for k = a, b; φa + φb = y, (1.8)
where xk is the vector of goods consumed by member k, and φk represents the amount
of resources assigned to member k, which, referring to Becker (1981), is commonly
called the “sharing rule”.
Browning et al. (1994) test their approach to a sample of couples without children,
while Bourguignon (1999) theoretically extends the approach considering a more
complex demographic composition of the family. The preference structure proposed
by Browning et al. (1994) is of “caring preferences” (each person cares about the
other’s welfare and the collective setting imply that however allocation decisions are
made, they lead to efficient outcomes), but as shown in Bourguignon (1999), the set
of Pareto-optimal solutions found with caring preferences is included among those
obtained with egoistic preferences. Moreover, “caring parameters”1 are in general
not identified, and in several empirical studies, they are just captured by the error
term. Although, in the collective approach, the caring attitude of a member is
implicitly defined by the “sharing rule”, independently of the fact of assuming or
not “caring preferences”. Hence, in the collective framework, egoistic preferences
1In a structural model, we could think that there should be a parameter or a function that
represents the degree of caring.
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are not synonymous of egoistic behaviour, as the more or less caring attitude of the
household members is part of the sharing rule.
While studying the welfare of children, it has to be considered that a child has
different consumption needs than an adult, and is largely dependent on parents or
other household members for the provision of their basic needs. In response to these
concerns, several approaches have been introduced to identify a welfare index to
scale income or consumption expenditure on the basis of the demographic composi-
tion of the family. According to Pollak and Wales (1979) and Bourguignon (1999)
these methods suffer from a weak theoretical basis. In fact, comparing households
with different demographic composition and, in other terms, identifying the welfare
of children within the household, can be properly addressed only if the process of
intra-household allocation of resources is explicitly taken into account. Bourguignon
(1999) shows that with the collective approach it is possible to recover the allocation
of consumption expenditures among adults and children sum up to an additive con-
stant, while Chiappori and Ekeland (2009) have formally shown that the complete
identification of individual welfare is achieved in the collective approach.
On the empirical side, several works confirm this attention toward intra-household
resource allocation and child poverty mainly for developing countries (see, among oth-
ers, Kanbur, 1991; Inchauste, 2001; Kebede, 2004; Sahn and Gerstle, 2004; Namoro
and Roushdy, 2009). However, none of them has applied the collective framework
to derive individual child welfare and, in particular, none of them has applied the
collective consumption approach. The latter seems particularly reasonable in devel-
oping or transition countries, where consumption is a widely used measure of welfare,
as incomes are difficult to survey because of the well known problems of informality
suffered by these economies.
While the measurement of poverty and wellbeing of children has in the past played
a marginal role in the overall poverty debate, in recent years they are attracting
increasing attention, especially in the US and the UK2. The approach proposed by
Bourguignon (1999) is, in effect, a reliable way to consistently identify child poverty
and to keep it separate from the analysis of adult poverty. We find that, in the light
of recent results due to Chiappori and Ekeland (2006, 2009), the Alderman et al.
(1995) claim that collective models should be the rule and no more the exception, is
2Pollard and Lee (2003) presents a comprehensive review of the state of literature on the mea-
surement of child poverty and wellbeing.
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becoming difficult to ignore.
In Chapter III, a collective consumption model is applied to evaluate child welfare
in Albania. To properly identify the sharing rule for the child, a simplified model
assuming the equal distribution of resources among adult members is used, and the
child is not considered a public good but an economic agent with egoistic preferences
exactly as the adult. In line with Bourguignon (1999), the case of caring preference
would be a special case of the presented model.
1.1.3 Child welfare and child development
So far, the study of welfare has been based on consumer theory. However, there are
several possible inputs other than monetary income or consumption that influence
the present wellbeing of the children and the future development of their human
capital. For example, the “capability approach” proposed by Sen (1992) suggests
that the status of the individual in terms of, for example, health and education,
influence the capability of gathering utility from income or consumption3.
However, independently of the approach, the many other dimensions of child
wellbeing are relevant on their own. Going back to the foundations of household eco-
nomics, the concept of “child quality” (Becker, 1981) indicates an holistic concept of
child welfare: children’s wellbeing depends on several domains that influence present
and future child development and thus the construction of future human capital4.
Another important aspect in studying children’s wellbeing is the opportunity to
stratify the analysis by age cohorts both in terms of indicators and in terms of policy
measures, especially if one refers to a holistic measure of child welfare. The outcomes
related to child quality, not usually captured by household surveys, strictly rely on
inputs that are easily measurable: child monetary welfare (or monetary resources
devoted to children in the family, discussed in the previous section) or children’s
ability to access basic services as health and education. In particular, the role of
education is fundamental for all of the domains of child quality and strictly depends
on the decision-making process within the family.
Despite the fact that school enrolment gaps between developing and developed
3This vision could be adapted to collective models in the sense that being more educated or
healthy can influence the sharing rule and thus individual welfare.
4The literature identifies five main domains: psychical, psychological, cognitive, social and eco-
nomic (see Pollard and Lee, 2003).
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countries have been reduced in many countries, children still frequently experience
problems in accessing education, even without considering the issue of child labour.
Moreover, the quality of education is generally poor, and enrolment may not result in
proper educational outcomes, with the consequence that being more educated may
not produce economic benefits, reducing the incentive to send children to school.
Focusing on young children, several studies have provided evidence of the impor-
tance of participation in early-childhood programmes, defined as a human capital
investment in the first years of life. Children’s attendance to preschool programmes,
especially in developing countries, is a determinant factor for cognitive development,
health and nutritional status, school performance, productivity and income over the
life course. Thus, preschool attendance is an indicator of several domains of child
welfare, such as health, nutrition, socialisation, better education attainment in the
future and so on (see Heckman and Masterov, 2007; Doyle et al., 2009, for a review
of the economic rationale for investing in early childhood).
Focusing on school-aged children, developing countries still suffer from two major
gaps: the gender gap and the rural/urban gap both in mandatory primary school
and in the secondary school (Orazem and King, 2008). For this reason, it still makes
sense to refer to a theoretical model of household behaviour for schooling. Orazem
and King (2008) propose a simple static theoretical framework where the parents’
utility is
U = U(x, df , qf (Hf , µf ,Z), qm(Hm, µm,Z)), (1.9)
where x is the parental consumption of goods, qm and qf are quality indexes of
children, of daughters and sons respectively, resulting from human capital production
and accumulation, depending on the proportions of time in school, Hm and Hf , on
children’s academic abilities, µm and µf , and on a vector Z representing the quality
of local schools, teachers and curriculum, as well as the ability of other children in
the school; df is the discount for the utility of a daughter’s education with respect
to a son’s education (Becker, 1971), under an income budget constraint. Thus, the
linearised reduced-form demand for schooling for the child k in the household i is
Hij = α0 + α1Ai + α2Zi + α3Pk + α4Xi, (1.10)
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where Ai is non-labour income from assets, Pk represents school cost for child k (as
fees, distance from school, etc.)5 and Xi is a vector of household and community
variables. The error term of the econometric specification would include both the
ability and df which are typically unobserved.
In Chapter IV, this theoretical background is used to estimate demand for school-
ing and expenditure on education of Albanian households, extending the model to
the case in which one of two parents has migrated abroad.
1.2 Policies for children considering intra-household al-
location
Spending on education or supporting households with children is typically a long-
term investment for a government: the resulting human capital improvement can
influence growth in the long run (Mankiw et al., 1992) and reduce poverty thanks to
positive effects on individual earnings (Mincer, 1974). In the classical literature of
welfare economics, two types of transfers are studied to support a family’s income:
cash and in-kind. According to Atkinson (1987), the typical liberal economist’s
recommendation that redistribution should take the form of purchasing power6 may
not apply for several reasons. Examples include the fact that there may be different
preferences in the way income is spent and this preferences are not available to the
government (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988).
Additionally, when one refers to “policies to support families with children,” it
is clear that the final objective of the policies is child’s welfare. Within this class of
policies, a cash-transfer measure should aim at reducing child poverty, which means
adult’s poverty in the long term, while in-kind transfers usually aim at supporting
other domains of children’s wellbeing such as nutrition, health or education. The
effectiveness of both measures strictly depends on the behavioural responses of the
families. In the case of cash benefits, the effect on child poverty depends on the
targeting effectiveness and the intra-household distribution of resources7. With in-
5It can also be thought of as the child opportunity cost in presence of child labour.
6This recommendation in welfare economics has been set out by Arrow (1963) under the assump-
tions of a perfectly competitive economy without external effects and full information.
7Kanbur (1991) is the first to point out that changes in intra-household inequality as the household
welfare improves are important for the policy maker, as interventions are often restricted to the
household level, while the objective is to improve the welfare of children.
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kind transfers, government interventions are better targeted since they are more
selective (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988) and also influence family decisions with
possible indirect effects also on child poverty. For example, in the simple model
presented in Section 1.1.3, this may occur by subsidising the cost of schooling for
the family or by giving other kinds of support at the household or the community
level. However, since the price of schooling is not the only variable influencing the
decision to send a child to school, the government needs to take into account other
factors when designing in-kind interventions. For instance, if the government plans
to provide free lunch at school, it should take into account the possibility of a reduced
amount of nutrition received at home as a partial within-household redistribution of
the benefit.
In the unitary model of the household, resources are equally distributed according
to each member’s needs. This implies that the marginal welfare improvements due to
an increase of available income, as in the case of a cash transfer to the family, is the
same for each household member, children included. In the collective model, instead,
the impact of a cash transfer could benefit the member who receives it by strengthen-
ing his relative bargaining power. Thus, a categorical cash transfer programme is in
principle more effective in reducing child poverty. Moreover, conditioning the cash
transfer on specific requirements, such as child’s school attendance, should favour
the propensity to invest in the human capital of daughters and sons. Given the
weakness of the “Pareto-improving cash transfers” theory in development settings,
and the general concern for intra-household inequality, anti-poverty conditional cash
transfers have been introduced in many countries8, trying to re-conciliate the ad-
vantages of cash and in-kind transfers. Conditional cash transfers pose a constraint
on the exploitation of additional public resources given to families, influencing both
the sharing rule and equations (1.9) and (1.10) of the schooling demand model9.
Barrientos and DeJong (2006) provide a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of
cash-transfer programmes aimed at reducing child poverty, focusing on child support
grants in South Africa (a categorical transfer)10, on family allowances in transition
economies (anti-poverty programmes supporting poor household with children) and
8Programmes that make transfers conditional on children’s school attendance or other qualitative
requirements have been introduced in Bangladesh, Mexico, Brazil and Turkey (Kanbur, 2009)
9Equation 1.10 is also influenced by the quality of services publicly offered, hence the potential
private return to education depends directly on the level of investment made by the government.
10It is an example of transfer reflecting the entitlement of poor children as individuals
10
on targeted conditional cash-transfer programmes in Latin America and Caribbean.
They claim that different models of arranging transfers to children have broadly sim-
ilar effects on household poverty. However, the previously raised issues of resource
allocation among family members and how the transfer is invested are not addressed
in their paper.
Looking at the welfare of young children, governments in several developing coun-
tries have introduced preschool programmes with the multiple objectives of improving
child nutrition, child future cognitive development and to promote the labour-force
participation of the mothers. A large body of literature evaluates the effects of
preschool programmes in the United States, targeted at children from impoverished
families (see, for example, the study of Chiswick and DebBurman, 2006, on immi-
grant families in the US). On the other hand, for developing countries, only two
relevant impact evaluation studies of preschool programmes have been recently con-
ducted (Behrman et al., 2004; Alderman et al., 2006). In general, researchers have
devoted little attention to preschool interventions in developing countries, and all of
the existing studies rely on the availability of detailed data on young children, often
gathered by government agencies to evaluate just a specific program. Fortunately,
things may change soon at this regard, thanks to the availability of new simple
tools valuable for the ex ante evaluation of public policies specifically targeted to
determined household members.
It is possible, in fact, to evaluate the outcomes of a child-targeted programme with
widely available household survey data using the collective consumption framework.
Bargain and Donni (2007) have developed a solid theoretical background for the ex-
ante evaluation of child targeted measures, basing their analysis on collective models.
In particular, they analyse the cost effectiveness of cash transfers and price subsidies
and prove that, under certain conditions, subsidies are superior to cash transfers.
Their setting starts from a household composed by an adult with a child, where the
adult has caring preferences toward the child and the child has egoistic preferences.
They rewrite equations (1.7) and (1.8), presented in Section 1.1.2, as
max
φa,φc
= va(p, y) + ρvc(p, y) s.t. φa + φc = y, (1.11)
where vk(p, y) is the indirect utility function for household’s member k. This pro-
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gramme solves according to the following first order condition
∂va
∂φa
− ρ∂v
c
∂φc
= 0, (1.12)
which enables the computation of the marginal effects of income and prices. Starting
from income, deriving (1.12) with respect to y and solving for ∂φ/∂y, they obtain
∂φ
∂y
= −λ
′
a/λa
θ
θ = −
(
λ′a
λa
+
λ′c
λc
)
> 0 (1.13)
where φ = φc, y − φ = φa, λk = ∂vk/∂φk and λ′k = ∂2vk/∂φ2k. The ratio λ′k/λk
is a measure of the concavity of member k’s utility and is called income fluctuation
aversion11, and the sum of both members income fluctuation aversions θ can be
interpreted in terms of complementarity, measuring the convexity of the preferences
of the benevolent parent toward the distribution of resources (the authors call θ index
of complementarity).
Equation (1.13) tells us that the effect of income on the sharing rule is bounded
by 0 and 1 and that an increment of available income will favour the member who is
located to the less concave part of its utility function. This tells us that if the child’s
utility at the equilibrium point is more concave than that of the parent, he/she will
be insured from income fluctuations, as the effect of income change on the sharing
rule will be small.
Similarly, the authors derive an expression for the effect of price variations on the
sharing rule:
∂φ
∂pi
= xci −Ri −
∂φ
∂y
xi (1.14)
with xi = xai + x
c
i and
Ri =
1
θ
(
∂xci (p, φc)
∂φc
− ∂x
a
i (p, φa)
∂φa
)
. (1.15)
In equation (1.14), there are three terms: the first two terms, xci − Ri, can be
interpreted as the compensated effect of price on the sharing rule, that is, the change
11The more the utility is concave (measured by ∂2vk/∂φ2k), the more the individual is averse to
income fluctuations. This concept is the same that founds the consumption smoothing theory.
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in the child’s share of resources resulting from a simultaneous variation in the price
pi and in income y, which keeps the utility of the adult constant. The third is a
standard income effect due to the variation of real available income caused by the
increase of pi.
Although these measures alone would be sufficient for the welfare analysis of
children, the authors also develop an Hicksian variation dV , a monetary measure of
the variation in child welfare, as
dV = −
n∑
i=1
(
∂vc/∂pi
∂vc/∂φc
+
∂φ
∂pi
)
dpi − ∂φ
∂y
dy, (1.16)
and apply this formula to the analysis of the marginal impacts of subsidies and cash
transfers. Finally, they develop a framework to assess the targeting issue, differenti-
ating the poverty line to be used to target poor children from that to be used to target
poor adults. The authors use these results to suggest a simple rule to select goods
for which the subsidy will have the largest impact on child welfare, to characterize
the level of subsidy below which this policy dominates a cash benefit - when both
instruments are implemented on the same cost basis - and to derive the conditions
under which price subsidies dominate cash transfers in child poverty reduction.
With this advanced framework and the possibility of estimating collective con-
sumption models with most living standard or household expenditure surveys, a
better evaluation of the effectiveness of individually targeted policies is possible at
a low cost. In fact, differently from randomized experiments, this setting is general
enough to allow for the comparison of different measures without further costs: it
would be a one shot investment of relatively small amount for a government.
This approach is particularly appealing for ex ante evaluations, but the collective
consumption model can be used also for ex post evaluations of policy measures as
shown in Chapter III.
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1.3 Children of Albania
Albania is the smallest of the Eastern European transition countries12 and has started
the transition process from central planning as the most isolated, undeveloped and
poor country in Europe. For centuries, the country had been unknown and isolated,
gaining its independence from Ottoman rule in 1912 and international recognition
in 1920. From 1945 to 1991, the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha and Ramiz Alia (from
1985) made the country completely isolated13. Albanian communism was signed
by complete reliance on central planning, the elimination of any form of private
property or activity and the strong emphasis on national self-reliance. A strong
propaganda was used to create the population’s sense of isolation and fear of the
outside world, which, according to the government, was waiting for the opportunity
to invade Albania (Lawson et al., 2000).
Consequently, when the transition began in 1991, it shocked the population,
which was completely unfamiliar with market institutions. Indeed, Albania was
one the countries following the “shock therapy” as path of reforms. Price controls
were eliminated, internal and external markets liberalised rapidly, the privatisation
process ended early (Azzarri et al., 2006) and tight fiscal and monetary policies were
applied. In 1992, the national currency (lek) was made internationally convertible
with a floating exchange rate (Bezemer, 2001). After an initial dramatic period of
decrease in output, high inflation and waves of poverty-induced emigration, by the
end of 1992 the macroeconomic circumstances stabilised and in the subsequent four
years the recovery continued with an average GDP growth rate close to 10% (Jarvis,
2000).
The sharp break in positive trends came in spring 1997. Pyramid (or Ponzi14)
schemes had been operating since 1992, and in February 1997, they collapsed with a
large share of population’s savings. The diffused rebellion, induced by the collusion
between pyramid entrepreneurs and the government elected democratically in 1992,
ended in civil disorders and the collapse of state power, with the south of the country
12It is located by the Adriatic Sea, bordering Greece to the South, Macedonia to the East and
Yugoslavia to the North; it has a population of 3.2 million.
13The dictators were hostile to any external influence, breaking with USSR and China, as they
were “too moderate” (Jarvis, 2000).
14Ponzi finance is a situation in which cash payments on debts are met by increasing the amount
of debt outstanding (Bezemer, 2001)
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controlled by armed groups. More than 3,000 people were killed and an international
military force intervened to allow humanitarian operations. The economy collapsed,
but, in the following years, the country performed quite well in sustaining high
rates of growth and allowing the economy to approach middle-income nations levels;
according to the World Bank (from now on abbreviated as WB) between 1998 and
2006 real GDP has averaged almost 7% annually with good performance in keeping
inflation low (WB, 2006). In spite of this, the unemployment rate has increased to
about 22.7% and even to higher rates for women (28.4%) in 2001. Despite a positive
evolution in macroeconomic trends, and a good trend in poverty reduction, Albania
remains among the poorest countries in Europe, with 25% of Albanians living in
absolute poverty in 2002 and 19% in 200515. The recent global financial crisis has
interrupted the positive trend in the rate of growth and poverty reduction, with a
decrease in the GDP growth rate from 6.8% in 2008 to 0.4% in 2009, according to
the IMF.
1.3.1 The village and the household
During transition and under the described circumstances, the state and other formal
institutions became weak, leaving room for the re-emergence of traditional forms
of “governance”. The customary law, effective prior to communism, reacquired rel-
evance in the organisation of collectivity in Albania. The village is formally the
smallest level of administration, electing a leader of a council (head of the village),
which negotiates with the next tier of government, the “commune”. Usually, a com-
mune administrates 10-15 villages and refers to a district16. This structure is very
important in determining the households’ living strategies, particularly in rural ar-
eas. According to Lawson et al. (2000), the social institutions at the village level are
very important in part because of the absence of developed market institutions and
in part because of the important influences of non-capitalistic and pre-capitalistic
structures. Beyond the nuclear family, the vllazni (brotherhood) and fis (clan) are
very important in the economic and political structure of a village17. The first is
15These are the years in which nationally representative household surveys are available.
16In total there are 36 districts.
17This institutions came from the Kanun, a customary law used since the 15th century and
remained alive in spite of many attempts by governments to eliminate it. For the Kanun, the
authority is an exclusive prerogative of men. It legitimated the domination of men also within the
nuclear family.
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formed by brothers of a family (normally enlarged families) and is used for advice
and emergency aid, while the second is composed by members of an extended family
with same surname. The fis is very paternalistic, largely used as a network of mu-
tual support for economic information as well as income transfers. Cohesion of the
village as a community is characterised by the tradition of giving gifts to families
on the occasion of significant events, also to provide material assistance. Severely
poor households not able to reciprocate were generally excluded from support and
interaction (Lawson et al., 2000). In the northern mountain area of the country, the
key collective tent to be a fis more than the household.
However the family is a very strong institution in all of Albania. The socially
integrated structures of family are based on the patriarchal authority within the
family, where women have an important function in the management of the material
life of the household but do not take part in decision making. Traditionally, the father
allocates money within the family, and there is a general preference for male children.
A daughter leaves her natal home at marriage, becoming part of the husband’s family.
The status of woman during communism changed dramatically with the acquisition
of formal rights, access to education and involvement in production. On the other
side, private domestic life remained patriarchal also during communism18. Although
the strength of the family seems to resist during the deep transformations of the
country to communism and later to market economy, the intra-household relations
and roles have became weaker over time. Many studies have placed emphasis on the
nature of decision making within the Albanian household, which has been largely
complicated by the migration of young members (King and Vullnetari, 2003; Danaj
et al., 2005; Gjonca et al., 2008).
1.3.2 Poor families and poor children: a profile
One of early attempts to measure poverty in Albania was a study done by the WB in
1996 using the data from a Household Budget Survey conducted in 1993-1994. Later,
the first Living Standard Measurement Survey in 1997 suggested that poverty was
mainly a rural phenomenon, with almost 90 percent of the poor residing in rural areas.
The incidence of rural poverty was found to be five times higher than urban poverty
18For an extensive survey on the emancipation of Albanian women during communism see Falk-
ingham and Gjonca (2001).
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and was higher in the northern regions of Albania (WB, 2003). The first nationally
representative household survey was conducted in 1998 by the national statistical
institute (INSTAT), showing that households most likely to be poor are those that
are large, with three or more children, implying that a large number of children live
in poverty (WB, 2003). However, the LSMS 2002 was the first Albanian attempt to
collect all the necessary information for a consumption-based money metric at the
national level. In 2002, the incidence of poor households was 25%, while poor children
under five amounted to 34% and the proportion of poor primary school-aged children
were 32% and that of poor adolescents was 30% (WB, 2003). Moreover, one child on
seven in Albania was severely stunted, while one on three was moderately stunted19.
Primary school enrolment rates were lower among the poor and were lowest among
the extreme poor. The phenomenon was even more pronounced for enrolment rates in
secondary school. Spatially, households in the most remote districts in the Mountain
region in the northern and northeastern areas of the country were poorer, and more
than a fifth in this group lived in extreme poverty. A total of 34.8% of the rural
population was poor, and more than 30% of households lived of self-consumption.
Figure 1.1 shows that both household and individual poverty were more diffused in
northern areas and in the central eastern area. The southern area is on the contrary
traditionally richer, as is the area surrounding the capital city (Tirana).
In the period between 2002 and 2005, there was a massive reduction in poverty;
roughly 235,000 households were lifted out of poverty, mainly due to economic
growth. Average consumption increased by 17 percentage points in 2005, and the
difference in poverty rates across regions narrowed, mainly benefitting mountain re-
gions (WB, 2007). Instead, the urban/rural gap persists, as does the correlation
of poverty with household size and number of children. It is widely recognised that
children are one of the groups shown to be more vulnerable in the transition period20.
According to UNICEF (2009), the percentage of children up to 15 years in poverty
is 24.5%, the highest in Europe after the Republic of Moldova. The mortality rate
of children under five almost halved between 2000 and 2007, but it still reaches 15
per thousands of births in 2007 against the European average of 4. The incidence
19ALSMS 2002 collected good information on child and maternal health. Unfortunately, this
information is not present in ALSMS 2005.
20See Cornia (1995) for a detailed analysis of the problems suffered by children during the transi-
tion.
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Figure 1.1: Poverty Map of Albania: Headcount Ratio at Household Level (a) and
Individual Level (b) in 2002 by Districts (Tzavidis et al., 2008)
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of stunting21 is the second highest (27%) among transition economies of Europe and
Central Asia after Tajikistan. Pre-primary school attendance is the lowest in Eu-
rope, with only one fifth of children attending, and adolescents have experienced a
sharp decline in secondary school enrolment during transition (Danaj et al., 2005),
also because of the poor quality of education22. Consequently, education is costly
for households, and expenditures related to investments in human capital are likely
to be the source of strong inequalities both between and within families. Indeed,
income-related poverty is mainly due to the lack of access to basic infrastructures,
education and health services.
1.3.3 A country on the move
It is widely recognised that migration explains a large part of the decrease in the
poverty rate during the transition period due to the income effect of remittances.
Albania has been defined as “a country on the move”, witnessing one of the greatest
emigration countries of recent times. When in 1990 around 5,000 Albanians invaded
western embassies in Tirana, they were taking the first symbolic step towards their
“long-denied right to emigrate” (King and Vullnetari, 2003). Following this first step,
in the past 15 years, permanent international migration out of Albania has been
massive. About 34% of households have at least one former member living abroad
in 2005 and about 1 on 2 of these households have more than one former member
living abroad. Of the almost one million individuals who have split off from the
original household since 1990, about one half are currently living abroad. Of these,
about 80 percent are equally divided between Greece and Italy, while the remaining
20 percent have migrated to other European destinations or to North America (WB,
2007). Over 55% of permanent international migrants hail from rural households.
In more recent years, this ratio has increased, so that by 2002, migration from rural
areas accounted for about two thirds of total migration. According to WB (2007)
permanent migrants are generally younger, male and slightly more educated than
the average adult left behind.
21Stunting is a reflection of chronic malnutrition as a result of the failure to receive adequate
nutrition over a long period and recurrent or chronic illness (UNICEF, 2000).
22According to PISA assessments, their scores in reading and mathematics were the worst of
Europe in 2000 (UNICEF, 2009). Unfortunately, there are no data to assess the possible current
improvement.
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Remittances have a big effect in fostering national income accounting for 15%
of GDP between 2004 and 2006 (WB, 2007) and for 13% in 2007 (UNICEF, 2009).
They were also a source of foreign currency, which helped to cover trade deficits in
the balance of payments and provoked the negative macroeconomic consequence of
worsening the terms of trade due to the “Dutch Disease” effect. To date, much more
emphasis has been given to the analysis of out-migration, mostly of young household
members who, driven by economic hardship, are being lured to wealthier neighbour-
ing countries. Little attention has been paid, both in policy making and in research,
to the impact of return migration, which is becoming increasingly important as the
migration process matures. A study of the impact of migration on human capital
outcomes in Albania (WB, 2007) shows that households with permanent interna-
tional migrants have, on average, lower enrolment rates than households without
international migrants, mainly in the case of secondary school education. Conse-
quently, the positive effects of migration are counterbalanced by the outcome that
migrant households invest less in education, especially in that of female children in
rural areas. King et al. (2005) suggests that a deeper analysis of Albania’s migration
should take into account the ensuing difficulties felt by those left behind, especially
children and older people.
1.3.4 Policies towards households and children
The scarcity of public resources exacerbated by transition has led to poor social
services for helping vulnerable households and individuals. Indeed, if one analyses
the composition of Albanian public spending, there is relatively low spending on
education and a poor allocation of resources to health and social protection. In
2006 the expenditure devoted to education was 3.9% of the GDP, while the resource
allocated to health sector only the 2.7% of GDP. The social assistance account for
the 2.3% of GDP (WB, 2006). Including pension benefits on expenditure for social
transfers, the level of expenditure on social protection become more adequate: with
old age pensions expenditure the social protection account for 6.9%. Indeed the share
of expenditure devoted in 2006 to social insurance was the 76% of social protection,
the social protection accounts for 19% while labour market programmes 2% (WB,
2006). Following WB (2006) the tiny expenditure on education is efficient if compared
with similar countries, while huge inefficiencies result in the health sector and in the
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administration of social protection programmes.
Looking at the policies for families with children, there are no specific child al-
lowances but only a means-tested benefit towards poor households. This program,
Ndime Ekonomike, is complex to administer and is characterised by poor coverage
and the inadequacy of the benefit level23. It accounted for 2.3% of GDP in 2000
and decreased to only 1.2% in 2005. Looking at the household income composition
of poor families, the programme accounts for only 8.5% of their total income, while
old-age pensions account for 28%. Moving to in-kind measures, transfers for children
suffer from very poor quality of the services, as for education, which causes relatively
poor scoring of Albanian children with respect to other transition countries. Pri-
mary education has received most of the attention during transition, with a general
negligence toward secondary-school investment. Preschool education is not yet con-
sidered a priority in the education system, with the respective ministry allocating
not more than 5% of the total budget for that end. Following UNICEF (2004), poor
communes in the country do not have access to preschool system as a result of the
unavailability of funds and the preschool education system generally being faced with
myriad infrastructure, financial, and staff problems.
In terms of equity, in principle, preschool, basic education (including textbooks),
secondary education and school transport are free of charge for all households. Un-
fortunately, looking at the distribution of scholarships to promote education atten-
dance, the WB (2006) found that they tend to be very regressive24. Equity is also
worsened by the wide diffusion of corruption in the distribution of subsidies and
services. Since the collapse of communism, there has been a steady growth in the
bribe-taking behaviour of state officials. State employees in the health and education
sectors, and those dealing with services or benefits provided by the state, in general
demand bribes for inclusion in public programmes, medical treatments and schooling
progression.
23The level of the benefit was 2161.03 Albanian lek in 2005 with respect to an average salary of a
public sector employee equal to 27300 lek.
24These scholarships are available for secondary and tertiary schools.
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1.4 Contents of the essays
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter II analyses the target-
ing and the impact of Ndihma Ekonomike, a means-testing social transfer aimed to
protect vulnerable household from poverty during transition. The programme is the
only instrument supporting child poverty, even if it is not a categorical cash transfer
specifically targeted to children. It is aimed to be a general anti-poverty programme,
which, in reducing households poverty incidence, should also improve the welfare
of children, generally overrepresented among the poor. The programme recipient is
the family, and eligibility depends on few family features. Hence, the assessment is
developed using household data. In spite of a general lack of program evaluation
studies in transition countries, Ndihma Ekonomike has received considerable atten-
tion by researchers, mainly for its decentralised nature and because it was the only
public safety net during the Albanian transition. These analyses are concentrated
on community-based targeting evaluation or on the political economy of the pro-
gram. However, to see whether the policy instrument is effective in improving the
welfare of poor households, a robust evaluation strategy is needed. To perform a
consistent evaluation of a specific programme, one should observe the outcomes of
the participants in case they do not receive the benefit. Since this is impossible for
obvious reasons, programme evaluation literature seeks to find a way to predict miss-
ing data on counterfactuals. Thus, to evaluate a program, non-participants outcomes
can be used as counterfactual, and the challenge of evaluation is how to minimise
the bias, namely the differences between participants and non-participants, due to
observables and unobservable variables. Chapter II deals with this problem using
a regression-adjusted matching estimator first suggested by Heckman et al. (1997,
1998) and exploits a discontinuity in programme design to evaluate the advantages
of decentralised targeting. It is the first time that this methodology is applied to an
anti-poverty programme in a developing context.
Chapter III estimates the welfare of young children and evaluates the impact of
two kinds of policies on their welfare using a collective consumption model. It pro-
poses a theoretical model to deal with child poverty considering the intra-household
allocation of resources. Bourguignon (1999) shows the importance of using collective
models to analyse the cost of children, while Bargain and Donni (2007) develop the
theoretical foundations for the ex-ante evaluation of the impact of public policies on
22
child poverty within the collective framework. The proposed model, based on the
work of the aforementioned authors, considers an adult/child equivalent household
that allows to econometrically identify children’s individual welfare. The chapter
develops and applies the collective consumption framework to estimate the child
“sharing rule” in Albania and evaluates the impact that public policies have on it,
thus applying the collective consumption model also to an ex post policy evaluation.
The extent of child poverty and inequality computed on the individual welfare
measure estimated with the collective model changes with respect to per-capita ex-
penditure or equivalence scales, which do not approximate sufficiently well the real
intra-household distribution of resources. This suggests that policy makers should
take seriously into account the issue of intra-household inequality. In fact, the as-
sessed marginal impact of two different subsides - the NE benefit as a cash transfer
and preschool attendance as an in-kind measure - on children’s welfare suggests that
the in-kind is the most effective measure for alleviating child poverty in this context,
confirming the theoretical results found in Bargain and Donni (2007). This is just a
first step in the direction of assessing the concerns, expressed in the previous section,
about the difficulties of the Albanian household to find a new identity in the jungle
of values among the patriarchal tradition, values imposed by communist rule and the
changes imposed by the market economy: Chapter III explores the intra-household
resources allocation decision-making process spotting some light into the Albanian
households black box.
Chapter IV estimates the demand for schooling and expenditure on education of
Albanian households, extending the model to the case in which household decision is
influenced by the emigration of one or both parents. Albania in the last 15 years has
been a country on the move, due to massive male migrations abroad, and the phe-
nomenon of children left behind at home has a relevant incidence among migration
episodes. Development agencies have expressed concern for children’s wellbeing and
the investment in human capital of migrant families for the possible negative conse-
quences negative consequences of migration on children’s welfare when children are
left behind during migration. The rationale of those concerns is that, although par-
ents’ migration usually benefits children economically, the lack of parental care may
cause relational and psychological problems that may affect children’s welfare in the
long term. Features of the data available for Albania are fundamental to the scope
of the analysis. Unlike other surveys, Albanian LSMS 2005 enables the reconstruc-
23
tion of “left behind” episodes of children in the migration history of their parents.
There are two main advantages: 1) the status of the child during parental migra-
tion can be consistently recovered, and 2) retrospective information on migration
is collected, allowing to effectively identify the long-run effects of the phenomenon.
The analysis is conducted on three separate groups: children under the age of five,
primary-school-aged children and adolescents. As to the econometric method, probit
models are applied to evaluate the decision of sending young children to preschool;
school progression of older children and adolescents is modelled using ordered-choice
models; finally, focussing on school attendance, a survival analysis of participation
in schooling is performed with both discrete and continuous time models. The ra-
tionale behind this choice lies in the actual structure of the data. In fact, both
relevant episodes that are under investigation, i.e. drop out of school and having
been left behind, happened in the past. The Albanian LSMS allows to examine the
migration history of parents and the schooling experience of children. With these
data available, the choice of duration models applied to the schooling period appears
particularly appealing.
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Chapter 2
Cash Transfers and Weak
Targeting: the Impact of
Ndihma Ekonomike on
Household Welfare
The Albanian Ndihma Ekonomike is one of the first poverty reduction programs
launched in transition economies. Its record has been judged positively during the
recession period of the 1990s and negatively during the more recent growth phase.
This chapter reconsiders the program using a regression-adjusted matching estimator
first suggested by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998), exploiting discontinuities in program
design and targeting failures. The program has a weak targeting capacity and a
negative and significant impact on welfare. The recent changes introduced to the
program have not improved its performance. Results are robust to adjustments in
the outcome variable and to an analysis of the treatment distributions based on
stochastic dominance theory.
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2.1 “Pareto improving” transfers, targeting strategies
and behavioural responses
It is widely accepted that the abolition of poverty is a central policy objective. How-
ever, there is disagreement on what “poverty” means and which is the best policy
instrument to reduce it. The welfare economics literature from the beginning deals
with possible measures to alleviate poverty (Pigou, 1920). According to Atkinson
(1987) there are two main approaches to poverty reduction within welfare economics:
the “individual interest” approach (Harsanyi, 1955; Hochman and Rodgers, 1969)
and the “social welfare” approach (Arrow, 1973b,a; Hochman and Peterson, 1974).
Within the first approach the article of Hochman and Rodgers (1969) derive the the-
ory on “ Pareto improving” transfers1. They suggests that if the objective of a public
good program is reducing poverty, the immediate response is providing cash directly
to the poor. Cash transfers would be Pareto-dominant to in-kind services because
individuals would be able to allocate resources more efficiently2. However, one of
the problems that make cash transfers less preferable than in-kind transfers is that
the people responsible for transfers redistribution are not able to perfectly target the
beneficiaries, since in operating of a transfer program there is often an asymmetry of
information (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990)3. Therefore, if information about preferences is
not publicly available to the government, the superiority of transfers of purchasing
power over transfers of good disappears as suggested firstly by Nichols and Zeck-
hauser (1982) and later by Blackorby and Donaldson (1988). Following Nichols and
Zeckhauser (1982) in-kind transfers may be used to discriminate better between those
eligible for support and those who are “shams”.
Improvements in targeting efficiency aims at reducing some of these problems and
making cash transfers more suitable. Hence the effectiveness of poverty alleviation
capacity of family benefits depend mostly on the ability of the program to target those
effectively poor, as firstly pointed out by Akerlof (1978) and extensively discussed in
Atkinson (1995) and Cornia and Steward (1995) for developing countries.
1The approach of Pareto-optimal redistribution and its application to means-tested benefits in
cash is widely surveyed in Atkinson (1987).
2Atkinson (1987) surveyed the debate on the relative merits of cash versus in-kind transfers as
instruments of redistribution, a question particularly relevant in the debate of poverty reduction
actions in developing world.
3According to Atkinson (1995) there is a clear principal agent problem in the design of a transfer.
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To address the problem of information on who is poor, community-based tar-
geting uses a group of community members or a community leader, whose main
functions are not related to the program, to decide who in the community should
benefit. For this reason the decentralized targeting for social services has been largely
promoted by development agencies. The main argument of the supporters, firstly
proposed in the theory of fiscal federalism by Oates (1972), is the following: decen-
tralized management would maximize efficiency thanks to the information advantage
of the local administrations, i.e. the ability to identify who is poor and who is not
in a relatively small community. As consequence developing country governments
often delegate authority over the targeting of anti-poverty programs to community
organizations, while retaining control over how much goes to each community. An im-
portant advantage of this targeting method in developing and transition economies
is the traditional role played by community or village leader, which may assure a
better targeting efficiency. On the other hand, in the case of weak institutions and
widespread corruption, the road of decentralized targeting is less persuasive: there is
the possibility that local preferences are not pro-poor and many unobserved variables
are likely to be determinant, due to local program participation by the non-poor (see
Conning and Kevane, 2002, for an extensive discussion).
Evaluation of community-based targeting is likely to encounter numerous chal-
lenges. If local agents can identify the poor better than conventional survey methods
or means-testing, because they use difficult to observe indicators such as capability
deprivation, functioning, status, access to networks, etc., then evaluation of target-
ing according to standard criteria may not be sufficient. Coming to evaluation of
the program’s impact, the problem of unobserved heterogeneity related to local dis-
cretionality is again relevant in order to faithfully model the process of program
participation decision. Galasso and Ravallion (2005) offered a theoretical charac-
terization of the information structure in programs with a decentralized operation
and derived an index to measure targeting performance in the case of community
management.
Returning to the debate on in-kind and cash transfers, the latter are also prefer-
able for their long-term investment properties and the reduced risk of leakage-use of
payments in non-desirable commodities (undesirable behavioural response). Indeed,
an increasing interest among economists on income supporting programs is related
to the significant negative effects of such programs on the behaviour of the individu-
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als, for instance on labour supply, welfare dependence and savings (Atkinson, 1987,
1995). In particular Kanbur et al. (1994) studied how the introduction of the variable
“labour supply” influences the impact of poverty alleviation programs in developing
countries. Sometimes the disincentive effects of the cash benefits may be larger than
redistributive gains. A negative labour supply response, for instance, may offset the
program’s planned poverty reduction. Most of the evaluation on anti-poverty pro-
grams behavioural responses comes from developed countries. In developing world
this effects can be minimal since they have high rates of unemployment but the
evaluation is also more complex to address.
In order to properly deal with this concern it is necessary to make a step beyond
targeting evaluation and to exploit an ex post econometric impact evaluation or an ex
ante microsimulation techniques in order to effectively take into account behavioural
responses. The problem of evaluating econometrically the effect of treatment has
been deeply studied with a long history in statistics and econometrics, but the ap-
plied literature to public policies in developing countries is relatively recent, even
though growing and wide enough to see the different methods already tested. A
general request for consistent impact evaluation comes also from governments and
aid agencies, at the point that also several randomized trials have been recently im-
plemented4. Evaluation is particularly important when the objective of the program
is poverty reduction since it is relevant to see if there is an effective improvement on
welfare of the beneficiaries.
2.2 Anti-poverty programs in transition economies
In the former command economies of Europe and Central Asia, anti-poverty pro-
grams launched during the 1990s in response to the transitional recession were very
few and built on a complex system of categorical cash transfers, heritage of the social-
ist past. These programs took the form of cash transfers and were initially devised
for the poor.
The focus on the poor constituted a break from the past and emerged as a com-
bination of several factors. First, the transitional recession had increased poverty to
unprecedented levels and this required a government response. Second, transitional
4Randomized trials are a powerful evaluation tool but they tend to be costly and the results they
produce are limited to the measure under evaluation.
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economies acted under a severe budget constraint and the choice of a restricted num-
ber of beneficiaries was essential. And third, these countries worked in the framework
of international financial assistance and this assistance was largely earmarked to the
poor. Targeting the poor with cash transfers was an almost obliged choice for tran-
sitional economies. Even if these programs contributed in part to erode shares of
public expenditure allocated to education or health (Gray et al., 2007).
Since in the early transition the dominant coping mechanisms for the resulting
poor households was informal transfers from clan and community members, in many
cases when anti-poverty programs were implemented in the ’90s, a mixed strategy of
means testing and community-based has been considered a good targeting method
in order to reach the poor already exploiting the existing informal safety net (Con-
ning and Kevane, 2002). There is some supporting evidence, among the studies on
transition countries, that a community management leads to better targeting per-
formance thanks to the traditional role of the community’s or village’s leader (see
Marnie and Micklewright, 2005; Alderman, 2002, on Uzbekistan and Albania) even
if these studies have not performed impact evaluations.
Were cash transfers for the poor successful in mitigating the negative conse-
quences of transition on poverty? The answer to this question is mixed. Ravallion et
al. (1995) found that the safety net in Hungary was able to protect effectively from
poverty but did not play an important role in lifting people out of poverty. Okrasa
(1999) found for Poland a general positive impact of social transfers on redistribu-
tion, a positive but moderate impact on reducing the poverty spell and a positive
impact on exiting poverty. Milanovic (2000) found for Latvia a weak pro-poor role
of social protection benefits. Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) analyzed the role of the
social safety net in protecting the poor from the 1998 Russian financial crisis and
concluded that the social safety net in place was largely insufficient to protect the
poor. Van de Walle (2004) tested the public safety net in Vietnam and found a
very marginal role of the social safety net in protecting people from poverty or pro-
moting an exit from poverty. Verme (2008) looked at social assistance benefits in
Moldova using panel data between 2001 and 2004 and found a non-positive impact
on welfare. A comprehensive program evaluation is performed by Chase (2002) on
Armenia. He estimates the impacts of a social fund at community level in Armenia
and found a positive impact of education’s and water supply’s projects on demand
of education and health. The program, even if not specifically designed to support
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poor communities, benefits the less well-off part of the population.
All these studies emerged in the context of WB assistance to transitional economies
and share the feature of evaluating bundles of transfers rather than individual pro-
grams. This is evidently a limitation given that only a few cash transfers were
specifically designed for the poor. Moreover the majority of them do not perform an
impact evaluation of those programs on household’s welfare, which is the expected
outcome of the income supporting programs.
Despite of the positive progresses in evaluating developing world anti-poverty
programs, there is still a general negligence towards the application of these recently
developed methods in transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, because bud-
get constraints limit the use of public resources for evaluations and researchers have
not sufficient quality data in order to conduct consistent estimations. Also, several of
the early evaluations relied on scarce data, resulting in incidence rather than impact
evaluations, with limited or no consideration of behavioural implications. Moreover,
only a handful of countries had pro-poor programs in place at the beginning of the
1990s during the deep recession and only some of these countries maintained these
programs during the more recent growth phase. As a consequence, evaluations of
pro-poor programs during the recent growth phase are scarce and they do not benefit
from benchmark evaluations carried out during the 1990s.
2.3 The Ndihma Ekonomike program
One program that received consistent attention during the recession and growth
periods, mainly for its decentralized nature, is the Ndihma Ekonomike (Economic
Support) program in Albania. Case (2001) looked at political factors influencing the
local budget allocations for the program during the 1990s and found these factors
to be relevant. Alderman (2001, 2002) used a 1996 survey to assess the targeting
performance and found that a) targeting was rather good as compared to other
poverty reduction programs in developing economies; b) local officials use local infor-
mation to target the poor not easily captured by household surveys, leading to better
targeting and c) poorer jurisdictions are better in targeting the poorer than richer
jurisdictions. More recently, Dabalen et al. (2008) have looked at the program and
tested the poverty implications as compared to the old-age pension program using
the pooled 2002 and 2005 living standards surveys. They find a negative impact of
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Ndihma Ekonomike on poverty and a higher level of discontent with life for program
participants respect to a control group.
In this chapter, the 2002 and 2005 surveys are used following a different evaluation
strategy to assess and validate the impact of Ndihma Ekonomike on poverty. The
analysis considers the 2002 and 2005 surveys separately and exploit a discontinuity
in program design occurred during the period to evaluate the impact of these changes
on poverty. The treatment effect is estimated using a regression-adjusted matching
method first proposed by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998). Some valuable features of the
data allow to meet the basic conditions required by the method and estimate single
means differences for both years and the difference-in-differences over the period.
Moreover, the Conditional Difference-in-Difference Matching estimator proposed by
Heckman et al. (1997) is exploited to evaluate the impact of policy change occurred
between the two cross-sectional surveys. This change consisted mainly in a reduction
of the decentralized powers in the identification of eligible households and in the
definition of the program’s monthly payment.
In contrast to Alderman (2001), the present study finds that the program have a
very poor targeting performance. However, there is strong heterogeneity in targeting
performance across local administrations supporting both Case (2001) and Alderman
(2002) findings in this respect. Negative and significant effect on poverty for 2002
and 2005 are also found, which is in line with Dabalen et al. (2008) findings on the
pooled 2002-2005 sample. In addition, a non-positive effect for the period 2002-
2005 indicates that changes in program design have not improved the performance
of the program. Results are robust to adjustments in the outcome variable and to
an analysis of the treatment distributions based on stochastic dominance theory.
2.3.1 Eligibility criteria
Ndihma Ekonomike (NE) is the only program in Albania to target specifically the
poor5. It was introduced in 1993 in response to the economic crisis induced by the
transition process. Eligibility is based on means testing and categorical criteria and
5Details of the program can be found in the study prepared by Vilma Kolpeja for the WB ”Pro-
gram Implementation Matters for Targeting Performance: Evidence and Lessons from Eastern and
Central Europe” (2006) and from the Albania Law no. 9355 on Ndihma Ekonomike and social ser-
vices available from the Albanian Council of Ministers (http://www.mpcs.gov.al/ligje-legjislacioni-
social-ligje).
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the program provides cash transfers to eligible households on a monthly basis. In
2005, NE expenditure accounted for 0.4 % of GDP or 10% of government expendi-
ture on social protection, down from 1.4% of GDP in 1993. The program has been
considered crucial in the early transition in order to reduce poverty impact (Kolpeja,
2006) and targeting performance in the 90s was judged positively as compared to
other similar programs in transition economies (WB, 2006). NE was the first pub-
lic service scheme to be decentralized and its administration was responsibility of
municipalities and communes.
The program design changed on several occasions. NE was originally designed to
support urban families without other sources of income and rural families with small
land ownership. In 1994 and 1995 the law governing the program was reformed and
the program was extended to all poor households. The program was again revised in
early 2005 with the replacement of the means-testing formula and a few changes on
administrative procedures. This chapter focusses on the period 2002-2005 and with
special attention towards last reform occurred in early 2005, where the government
reduced communities’ role in the benefit’s administration.
Application to the program is responsibility of the household. The head of the
household files an application form, undergoes an interview at the local NE office and
provides a list of documents on the status of the household and its members provided
by other state institutions such as the property registry and the employment office.
Upon verification of the necessary documentation the household is visited by a social
welfare officer who is responsible for drafting a first list of beneficiaries based on
personal judgements and on the eligibility criteria established by law.
The eligibility criteria of the program are established by law nationally but local
officials have a certain autonomy in choosing beneficiaries and amounts. Local offi-
cials had the right to define the amount of the benefit taking into account various
social factors, in addition to the eligibility criteria established by law and described
in details later. However, only the largest municipalities such as Tirana and Durres
introduced by law a few additional criteria to grant benefits. In the remaining mu-
nicipalities exceptional factors are considered case by case in the process of defining
household’s benefits. This freedom of action in defining eligibility was reduced in
2005. Eligibility criteria defined by law include categorical “exclusion criteria” and
means-tests. Households are excluded from the program if the head of the household
or at least one member: 1) owns capital assets with the exception of the living house
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and agricultural land; 2) is employed or self-employed, except agricultural workers;
3) is unemployed and not registered as job-seeker, with the exception of disabled and
agricultural workers; 4) is leaving abroad for any reason except for studying, medical
treatment or working for diplomatic offices or international organizations; 5) refuses
offers for employment, community work or land if in working age; 6) takes “delib-
erate actions” aiming to get NE benefit if not eligible. In practice, these criteria
aim at excluding those households whose members are likely to have other sources
of income and/or exhibit a passive behaviour.
The means-testing formula is based on household composition and changed over
the period considered. Until 2005, means-tests were based on a formula that com-
puted income thresholds by household as T = M(0.95H+0.95E+0.19W+0.2375C),
where M was the national level of unemployment compensation, H referred to the
head of household, E was the number of other family members above working age
or disabled, W was the number of working age members, and C was the number
of household members under working age. In substance, the income threshold was
equal to the unemployment benefit scaled with the weights in parenthesis attributed
to the different type of household members. An eligible household received a cash
transfer equal to the difference between this threshold and actual household income
declared to the office. If the resulting benefit was zero the family was not eligible.
The level of the NE benefit was designed to be below incomes generated from un-
employment benefit, pension schemes and minimum wage. This was to encourage
households’ members to resume work when this became available.
Starting from 2005, a new law regulates program administration. Two ma-
jor changes have been introduced. The first is that the income threshold is no
more linked to unemployment benefit and the second is that the freedom of lo-
cal officials in granting benefits has been narrowed. The level of benefit that each
family can receive now depends on the income threshold computation defined as
T = 2600H + 2600E + 600W + 700C where numbers are expressed in local currency
(lek). The new law also introduced a lower bound for the transfer at 800 lek, which
excludes households previously entitled to a transfer smaller than 800 lek. A maxi-
mum transfer of 7000 lek is also established. Moreover, the smaller freedom granted
to local officials in assigning benefits reduces de facto the capacity of the government
to use local information for better targeting, an attractive feature of the program
until 2005. Thus, there is the opportunity to use the discontinuity in program design
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to evaluate the impact of changes in the means-test and in the freedom of choice
granted to local administrators.
In substance, given the characteristics of the program described, the key as-
pects to take into account for selection into the program seem to be: 1) Eligibility
based on household income; 2) Employment status of household members; 3) Local
heterogeneity in decision making 4) Presence of members emigrated 5) Property of
assets and 6) Urban/rural location (agricultural workers are waived from some of the
categorical exclusion criteria for eligibility). These are observable characteristics to
prioritize when considering program participation in the evaluation strategy.
2.3.2 Performances of the community-based targeting
Looking at Ndihma Ekonomike’s performance using a standard poverty analysis one
sees 1% and 2% of poverty reduction for 2002 and 2005, suggesting that without
the program the incidence of poverty would be higher (Table 2.1). Nevertheless the
relevant values of leakage and under-coverage rates show that there are problems of
targeting in addition to inadequacy of program’s design and resources. More than
half of the beneficiaries are non-poor families. Targeting coefficients are positive but
near to “0”: even though the program is designed to support poor families, it is
approaching to be untargeted6.
The targeting performance over time is mixed. Comparing the obtained results
with those of Alderman (2001), which refer to a survey carried out in 1996, emerges
that targeting has worsened7. Figure 2.1 shows that the targeting curve by decile
was steeper in 1996 as compared to 2002 and 2005 indicating that the share of NE
expenditure going to lower deciles was higher than the share going to upper deciles in
1996 as compared to subsequent periods8. Coverage and under-coverage rates and the
targeting coefficient improved between 2002 and 2005 but this has been accompanied
6The targeting coefficient, proposed by Galasso and Ravallion (2005) and reported in Tables 2.2
and 2.3, measures the difference between the proportions of the poor and the non-poor who receive
receive the transfer. If the program is perfectly targeted to the poor then the index takes “1”, while
if the program perfectly target the non-poor then the index is “-1”. Untargeted allocation is equal
to “0”.
7The survey used by Alderman (2001) is a different survey from those used in this study, but both
sets of surveys are nationally representative and the same consumption indicator used by Alderman
have been reconstructed.
8Consumption for all years is net of NE benefits.
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Table 2.1: Poverty Analysis in 2002 and 2005
Poverty incidence 2002 2005
Headcount Ratio (individuals)a 24% 18%
Headcount Ratio (households)a 19% 13%
Poverty Gap Index (individuals) b 5% 3%
Poverty Gap Index (households) b 4% 2%
Headcount Ratio without NE (individuals) 25% 19%
Headcount Ratio without NE (households) 20% 15%
Poverty Gap Index without NE (individuals) 6% 4%
Poverty Gap Index without NE (households) 4% 3%
a Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty index, FGT(0).Headcount ratio (pro-
portion of poor).
b Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty index, FGT(1).Average normalized
poverty gap.
Table 2.2: Ndihma Ekonomike’s Coverage and Targeting
2002 2005
Coveragea 11% 12%
Adequacyb 10% 9%
Undercoverage (Cornia and Steward, 1995)c 75% 67%
Leakage (Cornia and Steward, 1995)d 57% 64%
Targeting Coefficient (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005)e 0.167 0.230
a Percentage of NE beneficiaries on the population
b Average share of subside on beneficiary household’s consumption
c Percentage of poor household not covered by the program
d Percentage of non poor among the beneficiary households
e Defined in Galasso and Ravallion (2005).The index is ”-1” if the non-poor are
perfectly targeted, ”1” if the poor are perfectly targeted and ”0” if there is no
targeting.
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Figure 2.1: Ndihma Ekonomike’s Targeting Perfomance Evolution
by an increase in leakage and a decrease in adequacy (Table 2.2)9. Figure 2.1 also
shows that the share of NE expenditure going to the poor has marginally decreased
between 2002 and 2005 especially for the third decile. The NE expenditure during
this last period has declined by about 29% and this decline has not been pro-poor. In
other words, between 2002 and 2005 improvements in coverage have been achieved at
the expenses of leakage and adequacy. The program has been able to capture more
poor households but expenditure per capita has got thinner overall and marginally
thinner for poor households.
The targeting performance of the program may be explained in terms of sev-
eral factors. First, funds may be misallocated with insufficient funds reaching poor
areas and excessive funds reaching rich areas. The central NE budget allocation
mechanism to local administrations determines ex-ante the funds available for local
areas. Case (2001) found that political constituencies were an important factor in
explaining budget allocations and Kolpeja (2006) has noticed that 15-20% of appli-
cations rejected are because of lack of funds. These two findings could explain a bias
allocation of funds in favour of richer areas. Such problems are generally difficult
9My results on coverage, leakage and targeting coefficient agree with those published in WB
(2007).
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to address but can be improved if the design of the budget allocation criteria are
demanded to an independent body.
Second, the targeting mechanism in place may not be able to target the poor
efficiently, even if perfectly implemented. Means-testing is only one of the criteria
used to select households, selection is based on income rather than consumption
and the program has no proxy-means tests in place. Program administrators do not
have the same information available in surveys to measure poverty and this may
partly explain the targeting ratios estimated with surveys data on consumption.
This problem can be addressed by introducing proxy-means tests based on household
surveys to complement or replace the means-test formula.
Third, administrators may not be able to apply the targeting mechanism prop-
erly. This may be due to supply side reasons such as difficulties in administrative
procedures, collection of documents or misbehaviour on the part of administrators or
demand side reasons such as fraudulent behaviour or lack of information on the part
of clients. Alderman (2002) found that the information available to local adminis-
trators improved the targeting capacity of the program. WB (2007) decomposed the
targeting coefficient reported in Table 2.2 into intra-commune and inter-commune
components and found that two thirds of the targeting coefficient is explained by the
intra-commune component. The performance of program administrators within com-
munes seems to be more relevant than differences across communes (as evidenced by
the heterogeneity in district targeting performances shows in Table 2.3). The 2005
program reform reduced the freedom of choice of local administrators. This may
be a good or bad factor depending on how good local administrators were in the
first place. The results indicate an improvement in the targeting coefficient between
2002 and 2005 together with a growth in leakage and a reduction in adequacy, a
rather mixed picture. Nevertheless, the targeting capacity of administrators can be
improved with a combination of training, public information campaigns and anti-
corruption measures.
Fourth, targeting during a recession phase may be different from targeting during
a growth phase. During a recession public resources are scarcer while poverty is
widespread. With more poor it is easier to catch the poor although transfers may
be low. Different is the outlook during a growth phase. With more money and
less poverty it is easier to spread money around increasing coverage and leakage at
the same time. Albania acted counter-cyclically with a 29% drop in NE program
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Table 2.3: Targeting Coefficients by District
District Targeting Coefficient in 2002 Targeting Coefficient in 2005
BERAT 0.359 0.354
BULQIZE 0.071 0.282
DELVINE 0 0
DEVOLL 0 0.19
DIBER 0.273 0.23
DURRES 0.064 -0.008
ELBASAN 0.020 0.177
FIER 0.098 0.138
GJIROKASTER -0.032 0.195
GRAMSH 0.194 0.094
HAS 0.636 0.409
KAVAJE 0.063 0.235
KOLONJE 0 -0.133
KORJE 0.208 0.377
KRUJE 0.227 -0.03
KUKES 0.404 0.208
KURBIN 0.219 0.196
KUkOVE 0.256 0.147
LEZHE -0.032 0.018
LIBRAZHD 0.149 0.231
LUSHNJE 0.068 0.109
MALESI E MADHE 0 0.1
MALLAKASTER 0.256 -0.025
MAT 0.100 0.404
MIRDITE 0.103 0.342
PEQIN 0.196 0.589
PERMET 0 0
POGRADEC 0.361 0.297
PUKE -0.034 0.431
SARANDE 0.311 0.456
SHKODER 0.116 0.303
SKRAPAR 0.600 0.444
TEPELENE 0.203 0.7
TIRANE 0.065 0.194
TROPOJE 0.328 0.045
VLORE 0.132 -0.013
allocations in real terms between 2000 and 2006 (WB, 2007) and achieved higher
coverage and leakage by reducing average transfers per household. The expenditure
reduction may be partly explained by a reduction in needs and applications to the
program during the growth phase but the reduction in expenditure per household is
hardly a pro-poor policy. This is another aspect of the program that can be improved.
2.4 Data and variables
The available data used for the evaluation of the NE program are two rounds of
the Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), 2002 and 2005. These
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data contain information on income and cash transfers divided by program as well as
sections on labor participation, migration and household assets, allowing to identify
the NE transfer with precision and also recover the variables used for eligibility. The
2002 and 2005 surveys covered 3,599 and 3,640 households respectively, employed
the same questionnaire and the same sampling procedure and estimates from the two
samples are fully comparable. The surveys include also a community questionnaire
with information on local services and socio-economic conditions10. It helps in order
to control for community fixed effects and to determine the behavioural traits of
administrators otherwise unobserved.
To strictly reproduce assignment process, an household’s threshold is compute
with the formula reported above, subtracting declared household’s. A dummy vari-
able “eligible” is defided to take value “1” if the household is eligible on the basis of
the means testing formula. It was possible to define dummies for exclusion criteria
for both years: exclusion if one household’s member is employed, exclusion if one
is abroad for reason different from studying and receiving health care, exclusion if
there are properties different than land, exclusion if one unemployed member is not
registered to the local labour office and a dummy for urban/rural residence. The
local official discretionality has been measured using the methodology proposed by
Galasso and Ravallion (2005) as proxy of good local governance. The targeting coef-
ficient measures the difference between the proportions of the poor and the non-poor
who receive receive the transfer. If the program is perfectly targeted to the poor
then the index takes “1”, while if the program perfectly target the non-poor then
the index is “-1”. Untargeted allocation is equal to “0”.The coefficient has been
measured by district since the survey contains an average of only eight household
per municipality/communes, clearly too few to construct a municipality’s targeting
index. In Albania there are 36 districts. In the sample, each district is composed
of, on average, seven municipalities or communes. Table 2.3 reports targeting coeffi-
cients for each Albania’s district, showing a large variability of targeting performance
along the country.
The study is concerned with the welfare improving capacity of the NE program,
hence the chosen outcome variable is a measure of welfare. Following a standard
practice in similar studies, per-capita household expenditure normalized by an abso-
10Note that the community questionnaire is not administrated at municipality/communes level,
but at a smaller territorial unit such as rural villages or urban blocks.
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lute poverty line is used (Ravallion et al., 1995; Van de Walle, 2003). The aggregate
consumption and the poverty line are calculated by the WB and contains the fol-
lowing components: food consumption (both purchased and consumed from own
production), non food expenses (clothing, household articles etc.), utilities (gas, tele-
phone, electricity, etc), education, and durables. The poverty line comes from the
basic needs methodology (Ravallion and Bidani, 1994).
The outcome’s explanatory variables are: household characteristics as age, ed-
ucation and health of the household’s head plus family composition (proportion of
working age members, number of children); local environmental variables influencing
consumption, as the availability of local services and dummies for districts; proxy of
economic status, chosen as the share of working members within the household.
2.5 Evaluation strategy
Evaluation strategies in program evaluation are mainly a way to deal with a missing
data problem: counterfactual outcomes from program’s participants. In order to
perform a consistent evaluation of a specific program one should observe the out-
comes of the participants in case they would not receive the benefit. Since this is
impossible for obvious reasons, program evaluation literature seeks to find a way to
predict missing data on counterfactuals. Thus in order to evaluate a program, non-
participants outcomes can be used as counterfactual and the challenge of evaluation
is how to minimize the bias, namely the differences between participants and non-
participants, due to observables and unobservable variables. This means to measure
the gain from moving an individual from the state “without treatment” to the state
“with treatment”. The program evaluation literature has focused indeed mainly in
the estimation of the effects of the program on outcomes of program participants,
assuming that the indirect effects of non participant are negligible (Todd, 2008).
This assumption held in particular when a non-contributive anti-poverty program
financed by the government is evaluated.
In this study, Y0t and Y1t are the two potential welfare outcome, household ex-
penditure normalized by an absolute poverty line, for each household i in 2002 and
2005. T is the binary variable of treatment assuming “1” if the household receive the
NE benefit and “0” if does not get it, while X is a vector of household attributes. It
is not possible to compute directly the difference between the two outcomes since the
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potential welfare Y0 is not observed, non-participants outcome is used as counterfac-
tual, the problem of selection bias arises. In fact, the assignment of the Albanian
program is based on a means testing targeting with a designed process of placement
and it is likely to have selection bias when comparing outcomes between participants
and non-participants. The most robust way to solve this problem would be using data
from a social experiment. A social experiment if properly designed would aim at ran-
domize placement, such that all households would have ex-ante the same chance to
get the benefits (LaLonde, 1986; Heckman et al., 1998a). Unfortunately, randomized
data are not available, hence to consistent compare NE beneficiaries with the non
recipient households and to compute the treatment effects an alternative technique
must be used. In this case, the decentralized program management is an additional
source of potential bias that may cause municipality fixed effects, possibly related to
their targeting efficiency. One way to solve this problem could be to eliminate time-
invariant bias, as community’s fixed effects, using pre-intervention data but since the
program ha been introduced for the first time in 1993, this is not possible with the
available data.
Let T = 1 define individuals treated by the program and T = 0 individuals
non treated by the program under study. Let also Y1 be the potential outcome
in the treated state and Y0 the potential outcome in the untreated state. There
are two possible potential outcome states for each of the two groups, treated and
non-treated. The main parameter of interest in program evaluations is the Average
impact of Treatment on the Treated (ATT):11
ATT = E(Y1 − Y0|T = 1) (2.1)
The central problem in program evaluation is that the potential outcomes of the
treated Y1 and Y0 cannot be observed simultaneously. There is a missing data prob-
lem and an evaluation strategy able to overcome the missing data problem, given a
set of available data, is needed. When the researcher disposes of a random experiment
designed ex-ante, the treated group can be considered as a representative sample of
11See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) or Heckman and Robb Jr (1985). Note that the program
evaluation literature has focused mainly on program participants assuming that the indirect effects
on non participant are negligible (Todd, 2008). This assumption is not always true but generally
holds with non-contributive anti-poverty program financed by general taxation, which is the case of
the NE program.
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the population and the estimation of the ATT boils down to the difference between
the observed outcome of the treated and the observed outcome of the non-treated in
the post-treatment phase:
ATT = E(Y1|T = 1)− E(Y0|T = 0) (2.2)
In the present case, a random experiment is not available and a simple comparison
of the post-treatment outcomes of the treated and non treated groups would result
in a bias estimate of the ATT.
Resuming, program participation in NE is based on a number of criteria that
self-select into the program only households with certain characteristics and this
generates a selection bias. An additional source of potential bias is the decentralized
program management that may introduce unobserved selection practices into the
program. Moreover, since a baseline survey is not available, a proper control group
must be detected before estimating the treatment effect.
In a non-experimental setting, reducing the bias is essential for obtaining effi-
cient ATT estimates. In particular, desirable features of non-experimental methods
are that (Heckman et al., 1997): (1) Participants and controls have the same dis-
tributions of unobserved attributes; (2) The two groups have the same distribution
of observed attributes; (3) The same questionnaire is administered to both groups;
and 4) Participants and controls are placed in a common economic environment12.
Feature (1) requires the conditional independence assumption whereby the potential
outcome from non participation Y0 is independent of program participation condi-
tional on a vector of observed variables X (Y0⊥T |X). Feature (2) can be achieved
with a process of matching on observables. Feature (3) can be achieved by using
the comparison group within the same survey used to observe the treated group or
by using an identical survey with the same questionnaire13. And feature (4) can be
achieved by controlling for local areas during the matching process.
In this study, the treated conterfactual outcomes from the comparison group
of non treated individuals are found within the same survey used to observe the
treated group. This ensures that the questionnaire administered to both groups is
12The experimental evidence in Michalopoulos et al. (2004) reinforces this assumption.
13Note that the questionnaire is almost identical for 2002 and 2005 for the variables used in this
study
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the same, which satisfies feature (3). To control for features (2) and (4), the chosen
strategy is to exploit a matching process based on observables for selection criteria
and variables related to community-based targeting. Thus, the main problem to
address is the question of distribution of unobserved attributes for the treated and
non treated groups, for which some further assumptions are necessary. However,
Heckman et al. (1997) have shown that, if conditions (2), (3) and (4) are met, the
bias arising from a failure of condition (1) may not be a major problem.
In non-experimental studies, condition (1) requires the conditional independence
assumption where Y0 and Y1 are independent of T conditional on X - (Y0, Y1)⊥T |X.
If this condition is met, the ATT can be estimated simply comparing participants
with non participants. Furthermore, with P (X) = Pr(T = 1|X) and 0 < P (X) <
1 for all X, the ATT is defined for all values of X and experimental and non-
experimental evaluations can be said to identify the same parameters. These two as-
sumptions are known as the “strong ignorability” assumptions following Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983). In fact, if ATT is the only parameter of interest, it is sufficient
for Y0⊥T |X to hold given that the ATT measures the impact on the treated only.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) also showed that the strong ignorability assump-
tions imply Y0⊥T |(P (X)) which suggests that matching can be performed on P (X)
rather than on X. Based on these findings, Heckman et al. (1998) derived that for
the estimation of the ATT is sufficient a weaker identifying assumption described
as E(Y0|P (X), T = 1) = E(Y0|P (X), T = 0). Now, partitioning the X vector of
variables into a vector of variables used in program selection Z and a vector of
variables used for the outcome equation W and considering the econometric speci-
fications of the outcome variable (Y(.) = βX(.) + U(.)), it is possible to re-write the
basic matching assumptions in terms of residuals as E(U0|W,Z, T ) = E(U0|Z, T )
and E(U0|P (Z), T = 1) = E(U0|P (Z), T = 0). These are weaker assumptions than
the strong ignorability assumptions and they can be used to construct alternative
matching estimators.
The problem of this choice is that finding good matches of the treated in the pool
of non-treated may be difficult due to self-selection. However, a combination of fac-
tors specific to the Albanian LSMS data ensures that this is not the case. Among the
pool of non treated individuals it is common to find eligible households who did not
apply to the program and eligible households who applied to the program but were
rejected. According to Kolpeja (2006): “The number of applicants for NE is much
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higher than those who receive the benefit. Some estimations indicate that about 30-35
percent of applications are rejected. The reasons for the refusal of NE benefit are: a)
incompatibility with (eligibility) criteria (about 5 percent), insufficient funds (15-20
percent), and c) provision of false information (10 percent).” Moreover, the pool
of treated household contains also non-eligible households. In substance, program
leakage and under-coverage ensure that among the treated and non treated groups
comparable households can be found. Indeed, the matching procedure achieves full
common support.
The condition (4) is addressed by controlling for local areas using a territorial
dummy variable which ensures that matching takes into account the local economic
environment. The territorial variable selected is the district. Albania is a small coun-
try of about 28,000 squared kilometers divided into 36 districts. The average size of
a district is a reasonable reasonable to represent local labour markets. Smaller terri-
torial units were also difficult to use in the regressions due to sample size limitations.
In addition, the participation equation includes a dummy for urban and rural areas
capturing the different features of urban and rural labour markets.
The question of selection on observables (3) is generally addressed with a process
of matching where a comparison group for the treated is constructed from a group
of non treated based on common observed characteristics. Following the discussion
above, this study applies a regression adjusted local linear matching (R − LLM
for short). This method was implemented by Heckman et al. (1997) and formally
justified in Heckman et al. (1998b). It consists of estimating matched outcomes for
the treatment group combining a local linear matching on the covariates of eligibility
with a regression-adjustment on the covariates of outcome. Single differences in
mean outcomes are used to compute ATT for the two years separately and then
estimate the Conditional Difference-in-Differences (DID) between the two years in
order to evaluate the policy intervention. For the single difference estimations, it is
first necessary to compute the conterfactual outcomes using a matching procedure
based on propensity scores. Single differences are based on the exogeneity assumption
E(Y0|X,T = 1) = E(Y0|X,T = 0).
When there is a detailed knowledge of the program assignment and clear eligibil-
ity variables are identifiable, it is also possible to restrict the exogeneity assumption
to observables on program design only, separating these variables from the covariates
of outcome. Heckman et al. (1997) found this exclusion restriction more efficient for
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reducing selection bias than the standard practice of estimating predicted values on
a set of mixed covariates. Hence, following this strategy, the X vector of covariates
is partitioned into a vector W of variables to be used for the outcome equations
(described in the ‘results’ section) and a vector Z of eligibility variables for the par-
ticipation equation (this vector includes all categorical and means-testing eligibility
variables described before).
By partitioning the variables into the W and Z vectors and invoking the exclusion
restrictios of eligibily variables and outcome variables, it is possible to estimate single
differences for each of the two years using a regression adjusted matching procedure.
The procedure implies the following steps: 1) Estimation of the predicted values
of participation based on the Z vector of variables and creation of a variable of
predicted values “pscore”; 2) Estimation of the predicted values of welfare using a
conventional econometric model based on the W vector of variables and creation
of a variable of predicted residuals “res”; 3) Propensity score matching using “res”
as outcome variables and “pscore” as propensity scores for matching; 4) Estimation
of the single mean difference in outcomes. In this way, a consistent estimate of
the ATT for 2002 and 2005 is obtained. Here the exogeneity assumption of the
outcome’s residuals holds14 conditional to the vector Z and the treatment status:
E(U0|P (Z), T = 1) = E(U0|P (Z), T = 0). The assumption should be verified since
the distribution of the residuals of welfare index (normalized consumption) are not
in principle influenced by the eligibility variables used in the computation of the
propensity score.
The conterfactual outcomes are estimated using a non-parametric estimation
based on a local linear regression which uses and weights all comparison group obser-
vations. Advantages of this non-parametric matching are the follows. Lower variance
is achieved and more information is used since the method allow the inclusion of all
non-participant as a control group. Local polynomial regression instead of a stan-
dard kernel, fits more properly with the data actual distribution and has a faster rate
of convergence near boundary points (this is a very desirable property since a large
part of the data is concentrated at boundaries). Moreover, according to Caliendo
and Kopeinig (2008) local linear regression is expected to perform better than kernel
estimation when the non-participants observations on P (Z) fall on one side of the
14The general conditional exogeneity assumption is applied to residuals because of the “exclusion
restrictions”
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participant observations, which is the case of the propensity score distribution esti-
mated in the participation equation (Figure 2.2). The local linear matching estimator
is defined as:
αˆ =
1
n1
∑
iI1∩Sp
[U1i −
∑
jI0∩Sp
W (i, j)U0j ] (2.3)
where I1 is the set of participants, I0 the set of non-participants, Sp is the region
of common support and n1 is the number of individuals in the set I1 ∩ Sp. The
match of each participant is constructed as a weighted average over the outcomes of
non-participants where W (i, j) is computed by a local linear weighting function on
the distance between Pi and Pj :
W (i, j) =
Gij
∑
kI0
Gik(Pk − Pi)2 − [Gij(Pj − Pi)][
∑
kI0
Gik(Pk − Pi)]∑
jI0
Gij
∑
Gij(Pk − Pi)2 − (
∑
kI0
Gik(Pk − Pi))2 (2.4)
A fixed bandwidth of 0.06 and a bi-weight kernel G(.) are used for the estimation.
Common support conditions imposed because Sp needs to be determined to compute
αˆ (2.3). Moreover, to ensure that the propensity score density under the common
support is strictly positive, a trimming procedure is also applied, excluding any P
point for which the estimated density is zero and the two percent of the remaining
P points for which the estimated density is positive but relatively small.
Based on the ATT estimations for 2002 and 2005, it is then possible to esti-
mate the difference-in-difference. Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a) have shown that
with panel or repeated cross-section data it is possible to adopt weaker conditional
independence assumptions using a difference-in-differences estimator of the type
DID = E(Y1t − Y0t′ |X,T = 1) − E(Y0t − Y0t′ |X,T = 0), where t and t′ repre-
sent time after treatment or the change in treatment and before treatment respec-
tively. In fact, it is sufficient for E(Y0t − Y0t′ |X,T = 1) = E(Y0t − Y0t′ |X,T =
0) to hold. Under additive separability and index sufficiency, this condition be-
comes E(U0t − U0t′ |P (Z), T = 1) = E(U0t − U0t′ |P (Z), T = 0). In substance, the
DID estimator does not require E(U0|X,D = 0) and allows for unobservable but
time-invariant differences in outcomes between matched NE beneficiaries and non-
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beneficiaries. The DID is estimated as:
αˆDID =
 1n1t ∑
iI1t∩Sp
U1ti − ∑
jI0t∩Sp
W (i, j)U0tj
 (2.5)
−
 1n1t′ ∑iI1t′∩Sp
U1t′i − ∑
jI0t′∩Sp
W (i, j)U0tj

This estimation is used to evaluate the marginal impact of the policy intervention
occurred between 2002 and 2005. Note that between 2002 and 2005 Albania experi-
enced rapid growth and poverty reduction, the DID matching can isolate the impact
of the program from the impact of growth because the matching is performed for
both years, hence comparing individuals equally affected by economic growth.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Participation into the program
The participation equation (Table 2.4), which models faithfully the program design
and is used for propensity score estimation, shows that the major role is played by
the means testing procedure and by the district targeting performance in 2002 and
2005. It was not possible to include all the eligibility criteria as independent variables
because of the need to find a specification able to fulfill the balancing property of
the covariates and to have a model with a high prediction power according to the
hit or miss method15. The final decision was to keep the most relevant dummies for
eligibility criteria and to construct dummies for local targeting performance measured
with the targeting index proposed by Galasso and Ravallion (2005) and described in
the previous section. The dummy variables local targeting efficiency are computed
using the quintiles of the targeting coefficient distribution in the propensity score
specification. The final specifications allowed to reach a good prediction rates for
both years (columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4) and for the different sub-samples (columns
3 to 6 of Table 2.4). The remaining randomness in the R-squared values of Table 2.4
is probably due to targeting failures not captured by the targeting coefficient. This
15The method classifies an observation as “1” if the estimated pscore is greater than the sample
proportion of eligible persons takink the subsidy and “0” otherwise (Breiman et al., 1984)
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Figure 2.2: Propensity Score Distributions by Treatment Status in 2002 and 2005
also suggests that the group of non treated households contains many potentially
eligible households, a useful feature when it comes to matching.
In order to verify how targeting failures affect program performance, program
participation have been modeled using two different sub-samples: one netted of bad
targeted households (non-poor receiving the subsidies - columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.4)
to simulate perfect targeting, and the other made of only poor households (columns
5 and 6 of Table 2.4). The significance of coefficients remains almost constant for the
different samples. For all equations (columns 1 to 6 of Table 2.4) reasonably high
prediction rates could be reached.
Table 2.5 reports the results of OLS outcome equations used for in the regression-
adjustment for the same three samples considered in Table 2.4. Important factors
explaining welfare are health and education of the head of the household and house-
hold composition, especially the presence of economically active members and chil-
dren. The R-squared suggest that these variables explain more than a third of the
variance of the outcome variable for the first two samples (columns 1-4) and about
16% for the sub-sample of poor households (columns 5-6).
2.6.2 The estimation of ATTs using R-LLM and DID
Table 2.6 reports the ATTs estimated with R-LLM and DID. For the matching
common support and 2% of trimming rule in determining the overlapping support
region are imposed. Trimming drops only one treated observation in 2002 and ten
treated observations in 2005.
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Table 2.6: ATT Estimations
no-leakage only poor
2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R-LLM -0.183*** -0.286*** -0.302*** -0.501*** 0.002 -0.039***
(0.029) (0.052) (0.038) (0.060) (0.014) (0.015)
DID -0.133*** -0.081 -0.011
(.038) (.064) (.011)
Observations 3599 3640 3302 3273 737 502
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Average treatment effects for the treated (ATTs) are negative for both years in-
dicating a negative impact of the program on welfare16. The negative effect is also
rather large, around a third of the value of the poverty line for the whole sample in
2002 and 2005. The impact of the program also worsens over the period suggest-
ing that changes introduced to the program have not been beneficial, even though
targeting is not clearly worsened. Performing the evaluation eliminating the “error
II” households, leads to an even stronger negative impact. For poor households the
program seems to haves no impact in 2002 and a negative impact in 2005.
To test the robustness of the results, the estimation is repeated using consumption
per adult equivalent rather than consumption per capita, and four alternative poverty
lines (60%, 80%, 120% and 140% of the official poverty line), as shown in Table 2.7.
Results are very consistent in showing a negative value for both years. However, the
size of the impact changes significantly when the poverty line changes. For example,
with a very low poverty line (60% of the official poverty line) the negative impact
of the program is twice as large as the one estimated with a very high poverty line
(140% of the poverty line). The DID estimates are also all negative when using
equivalence scales (Table 2.7).
As a final analysis, a stochastic dominance analysis is performed to assess the
distributional impact of treatment. Stochastic dominance of first degree can be as-
sessed by comparing the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the outcome
variable for the treated and control groups. Figures 2.3 plot the welfare index curves
16The standard errors are generated using a bootstrap re-sampling method instead of using the
formulae derived in Heckman et al. (1998b). Bootstrapping can be safer when kernel or local linear
estimators are used
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Figure 2.3: Stochastic Dominance Treated Outcome versus Conterfactual Outcome
and the cumulative distribution functions of outcomes for the treated and control
groups. The first shows the average welfare index with different poverty lines while
the cumulative distribution functions depict the cumulate share of population pop-
ulation by consumption level sorted in ascending order. As shown by Foster and
Shorrocks (1988), these two graphs provide the same information and can be used to
establish poverty dominance of first degree. The gap between the two lines in each
figure represents the program’s impact. From Figures 2.3, it is evident that the gap
is always negative for all poverty lines (the curves never cross) and that the gap is
higher for low poverty lines. In other words, the impact of the program seems worse
for the very poor.
T-tests for means of eligibility variables equality between treated and control
groups are reported in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. T-tests are based on a regression of the
variable on a treatment indicator. Before matching, this is an unweighted regression
on the whole sample, after matching the regression is weighted using the matching
weight variable and based on the “common support”. It was not possible to reject the
null hypothesis of equality of means for all the covariates in both years. Tables 2.8
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and 2.9 report also the standardised bias before and after matching, together with the
achieved percentage reduction. The standardised bias is the difference of the sample
means in the treated and non-treated sub-samples as a percentage of the square
root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups as
proposed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). It can be seen that matching has greatly
reduced the bias between treated and non treated groups and the remaining bias
for the matched group is very small and non significant for all eligibility variables in
both years.
After testing the balancing property in propensity score specification, the validity
of “unconfondedness”, which in the case of R-LLM is the assumption E(U0|P (Z), T =
1) = E(U0|P (Z), T = 0), where U are the residuals of the outcome variable “welfare”,
is also tested. This problem is addressed using the bounding approach proposed by
Rosenbaum (2002). The results of the test on the presence of unobserved hetero-
geneity (hidden bias) between treatment and control cases show that it is reasonabe
to assume that there is not hidden bias, and hence that the conditional independent
assumption should hold17.
2.6.3 Discussion and extensions
It is difficult to identify a clear and unique reason for these negative findings. The
applied methodology is largely supported by the literature on non-exeperimental
program evaluation and good quality data to model the exact program design are
available. A negative ATT of the antipoverty program in Albania could be at-
tributable to labor supply distortions produced by this kind of safety net consistent
with the concerns of Atkinson (1995) and Kanbur et al. (1994) on the behavioural
effects of social security. This explanation is supported also by the fact that being
employed is one of the exclusion criteria. Considering the relevance of the informal
economy in the country, one can say that ceteris paribus the transfer limits the sup-
ply of informal labour and hence reduce welfare in the long run. This interpretation
is in line with the theory but doubtful in the case of NE, where the benefit’s level
17The concern of possible influence of Z on the residuals of the outcome is additionally addressed
controlling for correlation with the single variable included in the vector Z: the results give correla-
tion coefficients close to zero.
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is rather small to be a wage substitute18. However female’s labour supply is usually
more elastic than male’s and even the small amount provided by the program could
discourage female’s work. Dabalen et al. (2008) find such an evidence but it should
be stressed that a highly informal labour market such as the Albanian one could
hardly be represented by a standard labour supply model.
One can attribute the negative effect also to targeting failures. However, ex-
cluding the poorly targeted households from the analysis, the impact is still high,
negative and raises remarkably between 2002 and 2005. Focusing exclusively on those
targeted households who are effectively poor (according to the surveys), the impact
of the program is found to be close to zero in 2002 but negative in 2005. The issue
is probably due to weak design of the program and the choice of the means testing
formula, which may not be adequate. It could be that the formula is poorly designed
and cannot capture the real poor or that the formula is hard to apply in practice
because of malpractices, frauds or corruption. Indeed, as noted in Table 2.4, district
targeting performance plays an important role for participation. In any case, the
negative impact could probably be attributed to several factors combined.
A good tool to provide precise recommendations about the policy design of an
anti-poverty program would be a (behavioural) microsimulation model (Bourguignon
and Spadaro, 2006), which would allow to evaluate at the micro level the impact of
any hypothetical reform. Clearly, an ambitious project as building a microsimulation
model for Albania, is beyond the aims of this analysis.
2.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter has evaluated the poverty reduction capacity of the Ndihma Ekonomike
program in Albania. The programme is one of the earliest poverty reduction program
implemented in transitional economies and had a positive record in terms of targeting
during the 1990s (Alderman, 2002). More recently, the program was found to have
a negative effect on poverty and life satisfaction (Dabalen et al., 2008).
The targeting performance of the programme has revealed to be weak and to
have worsened compared to the 90s. Between 2002 and 2005 coverage has improved,
especially in rural areas, but the average benefit per household has decreased (espe-
18According to law, the NE benefit is always smaller than the unemployment benefit (Kolpeja,
2006).
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cially for the poor) together with an increase in leakage. This explains a decline in
the overall budget share reaching the poor. Both under-coverage and leakage rates
remain very high by any standard. Weak targeting may be explained by various
factors including central budget allocation mechanisms, the design of the targeting
methodology, the behavior of clients and administrators and the business cycle. All
these factors are probably at work.
Making use of a regression-adjusted matching estimator proposed by Heckman
et al. (1998b, 1997), Ndihma Ekonomike is found to have a negative and significant
effect on household welfare in 2002 and 2005. Changes in program design between
2002 and 2005 seem to have worked in favour of rural households but, overall, the
negative impact has increased. The estimated difference-in-differences between 2002
and 2005 is also negative, suggesting that the community-based targeting, largely
reduced with the reform, was a positive feature of the program. Results seem to
be robust to several sensitivity analyses. Using adult equivalent welfare instead
of per-capita welfare increases marginally the negative impact. Testing stochastic
dominance of first degree comparing the cumulative distribution functions of the
outcome variables for the treated and control groups shows that the control groups
dominate invariably the treated group all along the curves.
The natural implications of these findings is that Ndihma Ekonomike should be
further revised. Possible reforms include the shift of the budget allocation decisions to
an independent body, the redesign of the targeting mechanism with the introduction
of proxy-means test and anti-corruption measures combined with public information
campaigns and training. A viable option would be to discontinue the program and
replace it with a new program targeted to vulnerable individuals within the family
or conditioned to a required household behaviour able to ensure a higher probability
of escaping from poverty trap.
Indeed, the evidence emerging from this study suggests that the problem is not
only about targeting but also related to undesirable behavioural responses of the
household. Testing the same methods on a subsample “cleaned” from non-poor
households among NE beneficiaries and a subsample of poor subjects only, gives
similar results. Hence, most of the problems are likely to be in the program’s archi-
tecture and means testing design. Conditional transfers or transfers complemented
with in-kind services delivery would probably improve the program’s effectiveness.
A major contribution of this chapter is the combination of robust methodologies,
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proposed by the literature on non-experimental evaluation to minimize estimation
bias, with a faithful modeling of program design, participation, decentralized manage-
ment and country context. This study performs the first application in development
economies of the non-parametric matching technique extended with regression ad-
justment, as proposed by Heckman et al. (1998b, 1997) and performs one of the first
systematic evaluation of social programs in post-communist transition economies.
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Chapter 3
Welfare of Children and
Effectiveness of Public Policies
Using a Collective Household
Model
The present chapter aims at contributing to the literature on children welfare eval-
uation by taking into account intra-household distribution of resources and, as a
consequence, intra-household inequality. This task cannot be accomplished within
the standard framework of unitary models of consumption, and equivalence scales
help only partially, since their scope is different. To investigate what happens within
the family’s black box, a collective consumption model is estimated and the predicted
sharing rule is used to draw some conclusions about the role played by intra-household
inequality for children’s welfare in Albania. The model is also used to look at the
effects that different public policies can have on child welfare. The results show that
taking into account intra-household inequality raises the Gini coefficient of children’s
welfare by nearly 10 percentage points and in-kind transfers are more effective than
cash transfers in improving children’s wellbeing.
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3.1 Welfare of children within the family: unitary versus
collective framework.
It is common opinion that one of the main aim of a modern society is to take care of its
more vulnerable members. Several categories of individuals fall into the definition of
vulnerable persons: disabled, people suffering from chronic illness, jobless, and so on.
Children are part of this list for several reasons, and even though they usually do not
suffer from critical living conditions, the policy makers should always pay particular
attention to child wellbeing, an investment for the future of their country. The aim
of this chapter is to contribute to the literature on children’s welfare evaluation by
taking into account intra-household distribution of resources and, as a consequence,
intra-household inequality.
This task cannot be accomplished within the standard framework of a unitary
model of consumption: in these models the reference unit is the household, which
is seen as a black-box within which consumption decisions and resource allocation
processes are unknown and assumed to be taken according to the members’ needs.
For example, one may assume that the household head takes all the relevant decisions,
including child consumption, and that this is optimal for the welfare of the household.
Such an assumption is unsatisfactory for the purposes of this chapter, since it would
imply that a sufficient measure of the welfare of household members is per-capita
income.
Equivalence scales partially deal with this problem taking into account family
composition, which implies assigning to each household member a weight according
to which individual equivalent income can be computed (Sydenstricker and King,
1921; Pollak and Wales, 1981). However, the use of fixed equivalence scales, a com-
mon practice in the applied poverty and inequality literature, could lead to ignore im-
portant household characteristics and the associated behavioural parameters. These
factors are particularly relevant in the developing world where cultural aspects and
socio-economic conditions may strongly influence intra-household inequality. More-
over, as pointed out by Ebert and Moyes (2003, 2009), for the computation of the
equivalence scales, only the cost of maintaining a child should be taken into account.
In contrast with the cost of raising a child (Browning, 1992), Ebert and Moyes (2003,
2009) include only child’s basic needs, such as, for example, food, clothing and hous-
ing.
62
The discussion about the use of a more or less restricted monetary value of child
welfare to correct poverty and inequality measures is beyond the scope of this chap-
ter. However, what seem to be clear is that in order to measure the welfare of a child,
taking into account only his/her basic needs is not sufficient. As a consequence, a
measure of children’s wellbeing that accounts for the actual distribution of resources
within the household is needed. This decision is crucial for evaluating child welfare,
especially for poorer households and in developing countries, where the amount of re-
sources is small and the welfare loss caused by an unfair intra-household distribution
may be relatively large.
More than twenty-five years are gone since Sen introduced the issue of gender
inequality within the household (Sen, 1983), and more than twenty since the devel-
opment of intra-household bargaining and collective models, but still there seems to
be no consensus on the necessity to use this kind of models for the empirical anal-
ysis of poverty and inequality. In a fifteen years old article, Alderman et al. (1995)
claim that the collective models, introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992), should be
standard practice, while the use of unitary models should be limited to special cases
where the collective may not be applicable. From the early nineties, several studies
have recognized the importance of taking into account intra-household allocation of
resources to properly assess poverty and inequality measures and to design effective
policy measures, but only recently Bargain and Donni (2007) developed solid theo-
retical foundations for the ex-ante evaluation of the impact of public policies on child
poverty within the collective framework1. This is even more relevant for developing
countries where a correct categorical targeting of anti-poverty policies can be par-
ticularly important to effectively employ the scarce resources available to the public
authorities (see, for example Haddad and Kanbur, 1992; Behrman, 1994; Phipps and
Burton, 1996; Peluso and Trannoy, 2007; Bingley and Walker, 2007).
Several studies on child poverty in developing countries pay attention to intra-
household resources allocation and child welfare (see, among others, Kanbur, 1991;
Inchauste, 2001; Kebede, 2004; Sahn and Gerstle, 2004; Namoro and Roushdy, 2009).
However very few studies on developing countries have estimated collective models.
1Their approach is particularly appealing for policy design, since it gives useful indications on the
measure that work best and in which conditions, however, it is not suitable for an ex-post analysis
as the one proposed in this Chapter. Nonetheless, the theory behind the two approaches is fully
compatible and a comprehensive analysis is planned for a future work.
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In fact, estimating collective labour supply models2, can be difficult for several rea-
sons: “standard” labour supply models are quite inadequate for developing countries,
where the assumption of competitive labour market is by no way close to reality3.
Recover, data requirements are usually quite high for these models and proper data
may not be available in developing countries. Another problem is represented by
the fact that collective labour supply models have not been initially developed for
studying children’s welfare, even though extensions that include children as public
goods for parents exist.
To investigate what happens within the family’s black box this study refers to
the collective consumption model by Browning et al. (1994) as applied by Menon
et al. (2008). This framework allows to shed some light on the household decisions
about the distribution of resources. Keeping the assumption of Pareto efficiency, this
approach assumes that the distribution of resources within the household is governed
by a function of exogenous factors, the so called “sharing rule”. The identification
of this function helps looking inside the black box for two reasons: first, it allows to
identify individual preferences, and hence individual welfare; second, while providing
information on how decisions to allocate resources within the family, it allows for
public interventions aiming at favouring a more equal intra-household distribution. In
other words, the welfare of the household’s members can be estimated directly rather
than inferred from the household’s relative position with per-capita or equivalent
income. Thus it is particularly important in the poverty and inequality analysis
among weak household’s members.
Traditionally, the measurement of monetary child poverty has been criticized
in favour of multidimensional indicators of children wellbeing. One of the main
point against monetary child poverty is that it implicitly assumes that resources are
allocated equally within the family and in the same way between the households.
With the use of collective models this weakness became less; some members of the
household may be relatively more or less poor than others.
2These are the model proposed by Chiappori (1988) and several successive works.
3Discrete labour choice models could be a better solution, but a collective extension of these
models have been proposed only by Beninger (2008) in an unpublished paper and in any case the
problem of informal work is not assessed in these models.
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3.1.1 Can intra-household allocation of resources be neglected to
evaluate public policies?
In a public policy perspective, a comprehensive normative analysis of the implications
of this class of models is still far from being complete. However, Ebert and Moyes
(2009) moved the first steps in this direction and, following the pioneering article
of Bourguignon (1999), which shows the importance of using collective models to
analyze the cost of children, other authors followed the intuition of using collective
models to analyze individual poverty and intra-household inequality (Cherchye et
al., 2008; Jeremy and Shannon, 2007).
In line with this stream of literature this study tries to explore new perspec-
tives allowed by collective models for child welfare analysis, following a theoretical
approach similar to Menon et al. (2008). In particular the difference in the child
welfare distribution with respect to a per-capita income approach is explored and
the assumption whether receiving public transfers could induce a modification of the
sharing rule is tested. To analyse in depth these questions a sample of Albanian
households with only children under five4 drawn from the Albanian Living Standard
Measurement Survey is investigated.
Albania is a particularly interesting setting where to study the welfare of children
and its relation with household decision processes. This country has been largely af-
fected by the transition to a market economy at the beginning of 1990 with the
children becoming one of the most vulnerable groups suffering sever poverty and
malnutrition problems5. In spite the fact that Albania is the youngest country in
Europe, with the highest percentage of people under eighteen (UNICEF, 2009), the
social protection system does not favour children and young people in any form. In
fact, the social protection system established during the communist era has been pro-
gressively deteriorated from the transition to a market economy. The traditional Al-
banian household acquired renewed relevance after the fall of the communist regime.
At the end of the Second World War Albania still was a very traditional rural soci-
ety with patriarchal family values, in mountain and rural areas the entire social and
economic structure was governed by the Kanun of Lek Dukagjini, a set of traditional
and unwritten laws, based on patriarchy and handed down from generation to gen-
4The study concentrates on these households to have a more homogeneous sample and to avoid
possible identification issues. More details can be fund in section 3.2.
5See Chapter I.
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eration since the Middle Ages. This set of laws gave males unquestioned authority
within the household (see Gjonca et al., 2008). During the isolationist Communist
regime the educational policies targeted on females changed the patriarchal house-
hold. However, the family maintained a central position in the society. With the
regime’s fall in the 1990s and the following rise of uncertainty, the country set back
to a traditional family structure, even if large migration flows out of the country have
added a new dimension to the phenomenon, especially in the rural areas (see Danaj
et al., 2005; Gjonca et al., 2008). Major problems are suffered by the early childhood
since the importance of children’s preschool years is not widely understood in the
country, especially in poor areas of the north (UNICEF, 2004). The supply of public
child care services is very poor and no safety nets measures targeted to households
with young children exist: at the moment, the family is still the only institution
able to protect vulnerable children. In such a context it is important to look inside
the household and study the relation between adulthood and childhood in terms of
welfare allocation. When designing family policies, for instance, the possibility of
identifying how resources are shared among household’s members can be important
to define eligibility rules, benefits schemes or to rank individuals in terms of equality.
Then, it has been shown that the impact of cash transfers on poverty among
children depends on the response of the household (Alderman et al., 1995). On the
other hand, there is a growing evidence that the identity of the recipient of a cash
transfer does matter in terms of outcomes (Alderman et al., 1995; Duflo, 2000). Thus
a social planner aiming to reduce child poverty through cash transfers should imple-
ment policy designs that ensure that cash transfers targeting poor children result in
improvements in children’s welfare, and/or investment in their human capital.
3.2 Resources allocation and consumption decisions
3.2.1 The theoretical framework
Unitary models of consumption are derived via maximization of household utility,
which depends on consumed quantities of some market goods, subject to a budget
constraint. Consumption of individuals is not modeled and income pooling is as-
sumed. The collective model, firstly introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992), extends
the unitary framework to recover individual preferences introducing a function, the
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“sharing rule”, which determines the proportion of household resources devoted to
each household member.
As a consequence, in order to properly estimate a collective model, the crucial
point regards the estimation of the sharing rule, and in particular its econometric
identification. Available cross-sectional datasets are usually collected at the house-
hold level, hence, in general, it is not possible to recover individual preferences. In
such a context, the sharing rule is not identified. However, the additional informa-
tion needed to identify the sharing rule is not much and is usually available to the
researchers. In practice, it is sufficient to observe private consumption of at least one
market good (Bourguignon, 1999; Bourguignon et al., 2009; Chiappori and Ekeland,
2006, 2009)6.
There are mainly three empirical approaches for the identification of the sharing
rule. The first approach is proposed by Chiappori (1992) and several successive
works, and consists in assuming that leisure time is an exclusive good that a member
of the household consumes when not working. Observing leisure time of each member
and evaluating it at some market (potential) wage, it is possible to identify the sharing
rule by means of a labor supply model. This approach is by construction not feasible
if one is looking for the sharing rule among adults ad children since children do not
work and, more importantly, do not have any (potential) wage.
The second approach proposed by Browning et al. (2006) assumes that there
is no change in preferences when passing from single to married. Using available
information on singles one can estimate individual preferences. These preferences
are applied directly to each member of the couple, recovering the sharing rule by
“difference”. Again this approach is not applicable to the case of children (not to
mention that it is subject to a strong behavioral assumption).
The third approach for the identification of the sharing rule, consists in using
available information on consumption of exclusive or assignable goods. If the survey
records at least one expenditure category which can be exclusively assigned to just
one member of the household, then it is possible to identify the sharing rule. This
method shares its theoretical foundation with the first approach, but uses a different
source of identification, individual consumption rather than leisure time, within a
6If private consumption of one good is observed, and there are no externalities, for a given
observed demand x(p, y) satisfying the Collective Slutsky property and such that the Jacobian
∂x(p, y)/∂p is invertible, then the sharing rule is identified.
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different framework, consumption demand rather than labor supply (Browning et
al., 1994).
The choice of the proper approach depends on the available data and on the pur-
poses of the analysis. In this chapter, since the focus is on measuring children’s wel-
fare, the third approach is the only applicable for the reasons explained above. The
expenditure dataset used in this chapter provides information on several exclusive
goods, child clothing, adult clothing, child shoes, adult shoes, education (assigned to
children), alcohol and tobacco (assigned to adults).
To properly describe the theoretical model, it is important to distinguish between
ordinary, assignable and an exclusive goods.
Definition. A good is ordinary when private consumption of this good is not ob-
served or deducible.
This is the common case in household expenditure surveys. The good will be
consumed by each member of the household, but it is impossible to know in which
proportion. Examples are numerous, and include food, communications, recreation
and so on.
Definition. A good is assignable when it is consumed in observable proportions by
each member of the household.
For example, if there is information on how far is the working place of the adult
member and of school for the child, travelling expenditure could be assigned propor-
tionally to the adult and the child.
Definition. A good is exclusive when private consumption of a good is observed
for an identifiable member of the household.
This is the case of toys or schooling expenditures, which should be consumed
only by children.
Assume that a household is composed by two members, an adult and a child.
The vector of household consumption7, denoted by x, is composed of ordinary goods
7If not differently specified, consumption goods or vectors refer to quantities. In general, super-
scripts indicate the household member, in the present study adult and child, subscripts indicate a
specific good.
68
o and exclusive (or assignable) goods ea and ec, and is additively separable, i.e.
x = xa + xc.8 Individual consumption xa and xc is not observed, while expenditure
on and prices of the exclusive goods (ea, ec, pa and pc) are observed and exogenous.
For explanatory purposes, but without loss of generality, the vector x is assumed
to be composed by one ordinary good o, with price normalized to 1, and two exclusive
goods ea and ec, with prices pa and pc respectively. It is also assured that the
household is not engaged in production9 and that labour supply is fixed. As a
consequence, household income is exogenous and assumed to be approximated by
total expenditure of the household, denoted by y and equal to p′x, with p ={1, pa, pc}
and x = {o, ea, ec}. Hence, the available information set is {ea, ec, o; pa, pc; y} and
the individual decision problem is
maxUk(ek, o) (3.1)
s.t. pkek + o ≤ φk(pa, pc, y)
ek ≥ 0, o ≥ 0, k = a, c;
where φk amount of resources devoted to member k, or, in other words, the sharing
rule governing the intra-household allocation of resources.
In this framework, the sharing rule can be viewed as a sort of contracting tool
through which household members decide how to distribute resources between them
and represents the link between the household and individual level of the decision
process. Once each member’s resources are assigned he/she will maximize his/her
utility subject to its own budget constraint. Thanks to this link, and provided that
it is possible to properly estimate the sharing rule, individual preferences can be
recovered, and hence individual welfare measures, from household data.
For the econometric identification of the sharing rule, a technique borrowed from
Pollak and Wales (1981); Lewbel (1985); Bollino et al. (2000), commonly used to
incorporate demographic variables, exogenous factors or household technologies into
8In this study, public household goods, as housing, traveling costs and so on, are not taken
into account. The reason is that the inclusion of such goods implies the adoption of a household
production function, possibly with economies of scale which, in absence of the proper information
in the data, would cause identification issues for the sharing rule.
9Rural Albanian households are likely to be engaged in household production (farm households).
The collective consumption model could be estimated separately, if a bigger sample size was available,
including household production for rural households.
69
demand functions can be used.
In general, demographic functions interact with exogenous prices or income and
and the magnitude of this interaction can be identified provided that there is sufficient
information and variability in the data. The analogy stems from the use of an
interaction term with income a la Barten (Barten, 1964) for the identification of
the sharing rule, where the estimation problem is similar to that of estimating a
regression containing unobservable independent variables.
In the next section the demand system is specified and a theoretical proof of the
identification of the sharing rule is provided.
3.2.2 Model specification and identification of the sharing rule
To derive the chosen specification of collective demand system a quadratic extension
of the Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b) proposed by
Banks et al. (1997) can be used as starting point.
Budget shares for a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QAIDS) are spec-
ified as
wi(y,p; θi) = αi +
∑
j
γji ln pj + βi (ln y − ln a(p)) + λi
b(p)
(ln y − ln a(p))2 , (3.2)
where wi(y,p; θi) is the good i budget share, θi = {αi, γij , βi, λi} are parameters, pj
is price of good j and y is total expenditure. a(p) and b(p) are two price indexes,
defined as
ln a(p) = α0 +
∑
i
αi ln pi +
1
2
∑
i
∑
j
γij ln pi ln pj (3.3)
b(p) =
∏
i
pβii . (3.4)
When demographic modifications a la Gorman are introduced (Gorman, 1976),
demographic characteristics interact multiplicatively with income in a theoretically
plausible way (Lewbel, 1985; Perali, 2003). Budget shares are modified as follows
wi(y,p; θi)⇒ wi(y,d,p; θi) = wi(ti(y,d),p; θi), (3.5)
where ti(y,d) is the income translating function and d is a vector of demographic
variables or household characteristics.
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Applying this transformation to equation (3.2) the following demographically
modified budget share equation is obtained
wi(y,p,d; θi) = αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γji ln pj + βi (ln y∗ − ln a(p)) (3.6)
+
λi
b(p)
(ln y∗ − ln a(p))2 ,
where
ti(d) =
∑
r
τirdr, (3.7)
ln y∗ = ln y −
∑
i
ti(d) ln pi. (3.8)
In order to comply with homogeneity properties of the demand system, this spec-
ification of the budget shares demand system is subject to a number of restrictions
on the parameters. In particular, to satisfy linear homogeneity in p and Slutsky
symmetry the following restrictions must hold
∑
i
αi = 1;
∑
i
βi = 0;
∑
i
λi = 0;
∑
i
γij = 0;
∑
j
γij = 0; γij = γji,
(3.9)
while, as proven in Perali (2003), to ensure that the modified cost function maintains
the homogeneity property, demographic parameters must satisfy∑
i
τir = 0. (3.10)
To next step to obtain the collective QAIDS introducing the sharing rule. The
maximization problem in (3.1) states that the sharing rule determines (the natural
logarithm of) the amount of resources that each household member receives. Being
the decision process individual rather than centralized, each member decides how to
allocate his share of total expenditure according to
wki (y,d,p; θi) = α
k
i + t
k
i (d) +
∑
j
γkji ln pj + β
k
i
(
ln yk∗ − ln a(p)
)
(3.11)
+
λki
bk(p)
(
ln yk∗ − ln a(p)
)2
; k = a, c.
71
Note that, as stated before, the two individual demand equations can be summed to
form the household demand equation. In this equation some individual parameters
cannot be identified either because of collinearity, for example two constants in the
same equations can not be identified, or because of data construction. For instance
prices and demographic characteristics are recorded at household level and are likely
to be same for all household members. Hence, summing up the demand equations
for the adult and the child results in
wi(y,d,p; θi) = αi + ti(d) +
∑
j
γji ln pj (3.12)
+ βai (ln y
a∗ − ln a(p)) + λ
a
i
ba(p)
(ln ya∗ − ln a(p))2
+ βci (ln y
c∗ − ln a(p)) + λ
c
i
bc(p)
(ln yc∗ − ln a(p))2 .
Household expenditure has been divided into the adult and the child expenditure.
In particular, in equation (3.12), ln ya∗ and ln yc∗ are defined as
ln ya∗ = lnφa(pa, pc; y; s)−
∑
i
ti(d) ln pi, (3.13)
ln yc∗ = lnφc(pa, pc; y; s)−
∑
i
ti(d) ln pi.
where lnφk(pa, pc; y; s) is the sharing rule of the kth household member, pa and pc
are the prices of the exclusive goods, and s is a set of household/environmental
characteristics which is likely to influence the intra household resource distribution
but not the overall household demand (the literature often refers to s as “distribution
factors”).
Note that in general the resource allocation decision process may be dependent
on households or individual characteristics. In fact, households with comparable
levels of income and prices may have different sharing rules, which may depend on
several factors, as the social background, education of the adults and so on. To
take into account this heterogeneity, the sharing rule is defined as a function of
observed individual expenditure yk, price of the exclusive goods pa and pc, and a
vector of other exogenous characteristics s, in analogy with Barten’s scaling, so that
a demographically scaled income is obtained, i.e.
φk(pa, pc; y; s) = yk ·mk(pa, pc; s), (3.14)
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which in natural logarithms becomes
lnφk(pa, pc; y; s) = ln yk + lnmk(pa, pc; s). (3.15)
In equation (3.15), mk(pa, pc; s) is an individual income scaling function, defined
over individual prices and a set of distribution factors s.
The identifying assumption in the model is that the portion of income of each
member, yk, can be recovered from observed expenditures on exclusive or assignable
goods. In practice, observed individual income yk is determined on the basis of the
ratio of the expenditure in exclusive goods, rk. Assuming that adult’s expenditure
is defined as the expenditure on his exclusive good ea plus half of expenditure in
ordinary goods o, and the same holds for the child, this is equivalent to write
ln yk = rk ln y, (3.16)
where ri defined as
rk =
1
y
(
pkek +
1
2
o
)
. (3.17)
From equations (3.15) and (3.17) it follows that the sharing rules can be written
as function of household income, individual prices, distribution factors and the ratio
of expenditure in exclusive goods, i.e.
lnφa(pa, pc; y; s) = ra ln y + lnma(pa, pc; s) (3.18)
lnφc(pa, pc; y; s) = rc ln y + lnmc(pa, pc; s).
Since lnφa(pa, pc; y; s)+lnφc(pa, pc; y; s) = ln y, by definition and ra ln y+rc ln y =
ln y by construction, given equations (3.18), the following constraint must hold
lnma(pa, pc; s) = − lnmc(pa, pc; s). (3.19)
To save on notation, set lnma(pa, pc; s) = lnm(·) and lnmc(pa, pcs) = − lnm(·).
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Substituting (3.18) into (3.13) produces
ln ya∗ = ra ln y + lnm(·)−
∑
i
ti(d) ln pi (3.20)
ln yc∗ = rc ln y − lnm(·)−
∑
i
ti(d) ln pi. (3.21)
In analogy to function ti(d), function m(·) is identified provided that there is
enough variation in distribution factors s and prices pa and pc, and as long as the
distribution factors differ from the demographic variables d. The proof is similar to
proving that function ti(d) is identified (Gorman, 1976; Lewbel, 1985).
In the empirical specification the m(·) function is a Cobb-Douglas function, so
that the logarithmic specification is linear, that is
lnm(pa, pc; s) = φ0 ln p+ φ1 ln s1 + φ2 ln s2 + ... (3.22)
The resulting model is similar to that proposed by Menon et al. (2008) to analyse
couples without children.
The following section describes the empirical strategy implemented to estimate
the collective demand system (3.12).
3.3 Empirical strategy
3.3.1 The econometric specification
When studying systems of the demand equations, the problem of zero “expenditure”
must be faced for those goods that are not purchased by a household. Coefficient
estimates can be biased when only observed positive purchase data are used, hence it
is necessary to apply the proper correction technique. There are several econometric
methods to correct for zero expenditures which differ in the assumptions related to
the source of zeros. For example the tobit model (Maddala, 1983; Amemiya, 1985)
captures the corner solutions for the utility maximization problem, which imply that
the observation is zero just because the household decided to consume zero on the
basis of disposable income, prices and its preferences. This could be the case for some
goods, but for some other it is not. For example, semi-durable goods (as clothing)
may not be purchased in the reference period simply because they give utility for
more than one period and a household may need to buy them only once in, say, three
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months. This situation is called “infrequency of purchases”, and cannot be properly
captured by a tobit model.
The Double-Hurdle model (Yen, 1993), on the other side, assumes that zero
expenditures are explained by a decision process that arises from unobserved latent
variables which drive consumer choices. The model allows a separate estimation
of participation -a technical expression to indicate the decision to buy a good- and
expenditure parameters. This is the case of alcohol, which may be not consumed
because of moral conviction or health problems, which are not observable in the
survey. Again, this model is not suitable when considering semi-durable goods, as
clothing.
An alternative to the double-hurdle model is the Heckman correction model,
which assumes that zero expenditures are due to sample selection bias (Heckman,
1979) and are treated as a misspecification error. This purely statistical approach al-
lows to obtain different estimates for participation and expenditure parameters, with
the participation choice assumed to be dependent on partially different observable
variables with respect to the consumption equation for identification.
In the original model, the first stage determines the participation probability
using a probit regression, and in the second stage, a specification for the omitted
variable can be used to correct, if present, the sample selection bias. The omitted
variable is known as the inverse Mill’s ratio, which is the ratio between density and
cumulative probability function of the standard normal distribution of the probability
to observe a positive consumption. In the empirical model a generalization of the
Heckman correction model which overcomes the issues observed by Amemiya (1978,
1979) is used. In particular, the reference work of Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) is
followed, which shows the inconsistency of the Heckman estimator and proposes a
consistent two-stages estimator for a system of censored equations.
Following the authors, consider the following general limited dependent variables
system of equations
w∗it = w(y,d,p; θi) + it, c
∗
it = z
′
itδi + υit, (3.23)
cit =
{
1 if c∗it > 0
0 if c∗it ≤ 0
wit = citw∗it,
(i = 1, 2, ...,m; t = 1, 2, ..., T ),
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where i represents the ith demand equation and t the tth observation, wit and cit
are the observed dependent variables, w∗it and c
∗
it are the latent variables, w(y,d,p; θi)
is the demand function, zit is vectors of exogenous variables, δi are parameters, and
it and υit are random errors. Without entering into details, system (3.23) can be
written as
wit = Ψ(z′itδi)w(y,d,p; θi) + ηiψ(z
′
itδi) + ξit, (3.24)
where Ψ(z′itδi) and ψ(z
′
itδi) are univariate standard normal cumulative distri-
bution function and probability density function respectively. The system can be
estimated by means of a two-step procedure, where δi are are estimated using a
Maximum Likelihood probit estimator, and used to predict Ψ(z′itδi) and ψ(z
′
itδi).
Successively, estimates of θi and ηi in the system
wit = Ψ(z′itδˆi)w(y,d,p; θi) + ηiψ(z
′
itδˆi) + ξit (3.25)
are obtained by Full Information Maximum Likelihood.
Besides the zero expenditures problem, another problem arises, namely, the lack
of information on prices and/or unit values. Since the survey records only expendi-
ture information10, the lack of information about quantities purchased precludes the
possibility to derive household specific unit values. On the other hand, available price
indexes have an aggregation level similar to that of the survey but are not sufficient
to provide plausible elasticities. For this reason, the procedure, originally proposed
by Lewbel (1989) to construct pseudo unit values is used. Without entering into
details, the pseudo unit values is estimated by means of
pˆi =
 1
k∗i
ni∏
j=1
w
−wij
ij
 exi, (3.26)
where exi is expenditure on the i-th good, wij is the subgroup budget share. Good
i is a good of the demand system, which is the aggregation of j subgroup goods (for
example food is the aggregation of vegetables, meat, ..., and so on). k∗i is a scaling
10As described in the next section, this methodology is applied to the Albanian LSMS by the
World Bank
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factor defined as
k∗i =
ni∏
j=1
k
−kij
ij (3.27)
where kij = mean(wij) is the mean subgroup budget share.
3.3.2 Data and sample selection
The data used in this chapter are drawn from the World Bank Living Standard Mea-
surement Survey collected in Albania in 200211. These data contain information on
household consumption, socio-economic conditions of the household and individual
variables related to education, labour market and health. The original sample covers
3,599 households, but only households with children under-five are selected for the
analysis. The sample consists of 511 households.
The decision to drop families with children older than five is due to several rea-
sons. First, the focus is on the welfare of young children within the family and the
support of public policies for early childhood. Since schooling is mandatory for chil-
dren aged 6 and more, preschooling represents an in-kind public transfer relevant
for child wellbeing12 and very selective for transition countries13. Second, children
under-five are not affected by the phenomenon of child labor which can influence chil-
dren’s bargaining power. Since the dataset used does not collect information on child
112005 data are not used because it was not possible to reconstruct the consumption categories
from the row data as needed. This is due to some intermediate datasets which are not included in
the available data and cannot be reconstructed from the do files provided by the World Bank.
12Empirical studies focusing on developed countries have shown the importance of early childhood
programs for skill formation. For example, Heckman and Masterov (2007) show that investing in
early childhood programs is a kind of public investment not affected by the equity-efficiency trade
off. The authors also focus on social benefits of preschool programs, especially for disadvantaged
children. In developing countries, preschool attendance is typically considered important for moni-
toring children’s health and nutrition status, especially in the case of poor children (see the empirical
works of Behrman et al., 2004; Alderman et al., 2006). Preschool is like a multidimensional indicator,
for example within the context of UNICEF’s basic framework of survival, protection, development
and participation, preschool attendance in developing countries is relevant for all the domains.
13Micklewright (1999) shows that enrolment rates in kindergarten, which is non-compulsory, have
dropped sharply during the transition in the Caucasus, Central Asia, South-east Europe and the
Western CIS while similar rates have fallen only slightly in Central Europe and the Baltic States. At
the end of communist period in Albania preschool enrolment was about 60% (Danaj et al., 2005), in
1992 the rate reached the 34% (UNICEF, 2004) while during the recovery period children attending
preschool programs still were only around 45-50% UNICEF (2004, 2009).
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in The Collective Model -
Households with Children Under-Five
Variable names Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Share of meat 0.148 0.082 0.000 0.541
Share of clothing 0.128 0.104 0.000 0.553
Share of housing 0.033 0.034 0.000 0.342
Share of alc. & tob. 0.018 0.026 0.000 0.155
Share of other goods 0.030 0.048 0.000 0.442
Share of food 0.643 0.131 0.273 0.946
Price of meat (log) 5.860 0.642 0.762 6.802
Price of clothing (log) 7.202 0.284 6.129 7.783
Price of housing (log) 5.794 0.234 4.534 6.393
Price of alc. & tob. (log) 5.873 0.162 5.447 6.343
Price of other goods (log) 6.041 0.543 4.427 7.134
Price of food (log) 2.883 1.371 -0.641 5.092
Total expenditure (log) 9.366 0.510 7.955 10.97
More females than males in the household 0.198 0.399 0.000 1.000
Household head has university or higher degree 0.096 0.295 0.000 1.000
Household head is in bad health 0.233 0.423 0.000 1.000
The spouse is in bad health 0.276 0.447 0.000 1.000
Number of children aged 5 or below 1.564 0.650 0.000 5.000
Number of adults 2.603 1.121 0.000 7.000
Number of elderly 0.480 0.500 0.000 1.000
Multiple couple within the household 0.343 0.475 0.000 1.000
Minimum income needed to make end needs (log) 10.443 0.565 5.992 12.899
Subjective socio economic status 3.640 1.656 1.000 9.000
Big house 0.143 0.350 0.000 1.000
Household has a telephone 1.746 0.436 1.000 2.000
Presence of emigrated 0.272 0.445 0.000 1.000
Female household head 0.139 0.346 0.000 1.000
Household head is young 0.378 0.485 0.000 1.000
Head have only primary or no education 0.583 0.494 0.000 1.000
Spouse is older than head 0.082 0.275 0.000 1.000
Bi-active couple 0.272 0.445 0.000 1.000
House is less than 40 square meters 0.166 0.373 0.000 1.000
House is at least 100 square meters 0.143 0.350 0.000 1.000
No preschools in the community 0.209 0.407 0.000 1.000
No ambulatory or hospital in the community 0.149 0.356 0.000 1.000
Price ratio 0.4960 0.055 0.345 0.711
Catholic or other non-orthodox religion 0.096 0.295 0.000 1.000
Child is ill 0.155 0.362 0.000 1.000
Age ratio of the spouses 0.410 0.155 0.000 0.632
Education ratio of the spouse 0.185 0.254 0.000 1.000
Receives NE benefit 0.194 0.396 0.000 1.000
Children attend preschool 0.252 0.568 0.000 2.000
Ratio of adult vs. child consumption (ra) 0.512 0.076 0.155 0.815
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labour, this would represent an unobservable factor for the present study. Third, the
sharing rule is estimated for an equivalent household composed by one adult and
one child controlling for household composition at the household level. However, the
presence of children of very different age would severely affect both the estimate of
the sharing rule and of the overall system of consumption demand of goods, posing
an identification problem14 for the sharing rule (Chiappori and Ekeland, 2009)15.
The estimation of the demand system is conducted over six categories of goods:
food, alcohol and tobacco, clothing, meat, housing and other goods16. Household-
specific prices, or pseudo unit values, of these goods are assigned following the pro-
cedure described in Section 3.3.1
As proved in Section 3.2.2, the identification of the sharing rule comes from two
observed exclusive expenditures. In this dataset, both clothing and footwear are
recorded for males, females and children. Moreover, it is sufficiently safe to as-
sume that consumption of alcoholic beverages and tobacco is exclusive to the adults.
Expenditure in education, moreover, is assumed to be exclusive to children -only
expenditures strictly related to preschool are included. Finally, in order to take into
account the number of family members, per-capita individual consumption is intro-
duced among the explanatory variables. In this way, within each household, the
individual expenditures equivalent to an hypothetical household composed by one
adult and one child are computed.
The gender dimension, which has been neglected in the model because of the
choice of an adult/child sharing rule17, is recovered with a dummy variable indicat-
ing if females are more than males in the household, a dummy variable indicating the
highest level of education of household’s head, dummy variables for head’s or spouse’s
chronic illness or disability, variables on family composition (number of children,
number of adults and number of elderly), a variable indicating the presence of multi-
ple couples within the household (enlarged families), a subjective declaration about
a minimum income necessary to survive, a subjective declaration of socio-economic
14For example it is not clear if children above twelve consume child or adult clothing and children
between six and twelve attend mandatory school.
15We plan to deal with this problem in a future work, aiming at extending the collective model to
take into account of resources distribution among males, females and children simultaneously.
16To avoid unnecessary complications only non durable goods are considered.
17Indeed, the research focusing on transfers between adults and children should not anyway neglect
transfers between husbands and wives (Bourguignon, 1999).
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status, a dummy variable taking “1” if the house is bigger than 100 squared meters,
a dummy owning a telephone and a dummy indicating if at least a member has
emigrated abroad after the “ pyramids crisis” in 199718.
The distribution factors s chosen to be in the sharing rule are: the price ratio of
the two comparable exclusive goods (the price of adult clothing divided by the sum
of adult clothing and children clothing), household declaring to belong to religious
minorities (other than Muslim or Orthodox)19 or not religious, chronically illness of
the child, both partners employed (“bi-active couple”), age ratio defined as female
age divided by the sum of partners’ ages, education ratio defined as wife’s years of
schooling divided by the sum of the couple’s years of schooling, Ndihma Ekonomike
participation (see Chapter II), and attending early-childhood programs delivered by
the public sector (the variable takes “0” if no child attends preschool in the family,
“1” if at least one child currently attends and “2” if all children attend preschool.).
These last two variables are introduced to test the possibly different impacts of cash
and in-kind transfers. In fact, Ndihma Ekonomike is a sort of minimum income
cash program, while preschooling can be considered as the most important in-kind
transfer from which a child is recipient.
As regards the variables used in the first stage probit estimates of the zero cor-
rection estimator, z, a larger set of variables than d is used. A description of this
variables is omitted because it is self-explained in Table 3.1 which reports the esti-
mates of the probit regressions used for the “ zero correction”.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Estimates
This section presents the results of the two-steps estimation of model (3.25). When
zero expenditure are observed for one good in the data, the first step estimates
the probability of observing a positive consumption with a probit model, while the
18The big financial crisis was due to the follows. Pyramid’s (or Ponzi) schemes had been operating
since 1992 and in February 1997 they collapsed with a large share of the population’s savings. The
diffused rebellion, induced by the collusion between pyramid entrepreneurs and the government
elected democratically in 1992, ended in a civil disorder and collapse of state power with the south
of the country controlled by armed groups. This caused a huge economic recession and massive
migrations flows.
19The two major religious groups of Albania.
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second stage uses the predicted Mill’s ratios to estimate the demand system with
Full Information Maximum Likelihood, imposing a-priori parameters’ restrictions.20
Table 3.3 presents the estimates of the collective QAIDS demand system21. In-
come and price parameters are significant, with some exceptions, as income param-
eter of housing expenditure for the adult and alcohol parameter for the child, which
are all non significant22. Among demographic variables, the general evidence is to-
wards small parameters values, even if many are still significantly different from zero.
In particular the interaction of higher education of the household head with income
has a positive influence on consumption of goods, even if more education does not
involve more consumption of alcohol and of tobacco. The number of children in the
family influences positively the household consumption of clothing and food, as ex-
pected, and to live in an enlarged family has a positive effect on the consumption of
food. The consumption of alcohol and tobacco is influenced by having members em-
igrated abroad and by the number of adults in the family. “Other goods” is mostly
composed by education and cultural expenditures which are influenced positively by
the education of the household head and by the self-reported socio-economic status.
Table 3.4 shows income and price elasticities. Signs are consistent with consump-
tion theory, with negative own price elasticities. The relevant exception is alcohol
and tobacco price elasticities which are positive. These goods may suffer from dif-
ferent effects on the estimate of own price elasticities: first, alcohol and tobacco are
not consumed by child but he/she could still influence household consumption in a
way that may not be properly captured by the model. Second, Albania has a strong
smoking tradition and a huge traditional consumption of made home raki rrushi23
which may bias estimates. Third, alcohol and tobacco are addictive goods, thus their
consumption may not be much affected by their market prices.
20Symmetry and homogeneity are ensured by construction, with the Slutsky matrix having two
individual income terms which sum up to the household income effect, because of the symmetry of
the individual transfers shown in equation (3.19).
21The parameters of the sharing rule are estimated simultaneously with the demand system, but
are report in a separate table. Instead, the estimates of the first stage probit regressions are not
reported: they are available upon request.
22It is true that alcohol is not consumed by the child but the demand system is estimated at the
household level, and it is possible that the presence of children may influence the overall demand,
and not only trough the “sharing rule”.
23Raki rrushi is the Albanian version of the Turkish raki. It is a spirit considered to be the national
drink by Albanians. It is made using 100% pure grape (rushi is the Albanian word for grape and it
is so pure that Albanians even use it to heal cuts and scrapes.)
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Table 3.3: Parameters and Demographic Variables of the Collective Demand System
Meat Clothing Housing Alc/Tob Others Food
Parameters
αi 0.070 0.162 0.005 -0.022 0.089** 0.696***
(0.067) (0.110) (0.032) (0.061) (0.040) (0.120)
γji 0.008 0.003 -0.001 -0.007** 0.000 -0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.0032) (0.002) (0.006)
-0.073*** 0.013*** -0.009 0.007 0.059***
(0.011) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
-0.024*** 0.008 0.006** -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
0.053*** -0.014*** -0.032***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.006)
-0.005* 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
-0.028***
(0.010)
βai 0.014 0.031*** -0.002 -0.029*** -0.029*** 0.014
(0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013)
βci -0.003 0.049*** -0.001 -0.033*** 0.017*** -0.029
(0.008) (0.018) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.024)
λai -0.004** 0.005*** 0.000 0.002** 0.005*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
λci -0.004** 0.011*** 0.002** 0.001 0.003*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
ηi -0.082 -0.232*** 0.033 -0.027 -0.024
(0.063) (0.055) (0.026) (0.018) (0.016)
Demographic variables
Females more than males in hh 0.022* -0.017 -0.005 0.010 -0.002 -0.010
(0.012) (0.018) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.018)
Head has univ. degree or higher 0.006 0.069*** 0.023*** -0.006 0.017*** -0.109***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.021)
Head is in bad health -0.013 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.005 -0.010
(0.010) (0.014) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.014)
Spouse is in bad health -0.033*** 0.028 ** 0.004 0.002 -0.005 0.005
(0.009) (0.013) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.014)
Number of children under 5 -0.001 -0.023*** -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.024***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009)
Number of adults 0.007** -0.012** 0.001 0.005** -0.004** 0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Number of elderly 0.026** 0.006 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.029*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.017)
Multiple couples within the hh -0.019* -0.030* 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.047***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.017)
Subjective “basic needs” income 0.007 0.019** -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.019**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009)
Subjective socio-economic status 0.001 0.003 0.002* -0.003 0.006*** -0.009**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Dummy - house bigger than 100m 0.009 0.011 0.003 0.005 -0.002 -0.026*
(0.009) (0.013) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.014)
Dummy - having a telephone -0.0064 0.0260* 0.0055 0.0014 -0.0053 -0.0212
(0.011) (0.014) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.016)
Dummy - hh member migrated 0.004 -0.018 -0.003 0.015*** 0.001 0.000
(0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.012)
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Table 3.4: Household’s Income and Price Elasticities
Meat Clothing Housing Alcohol/Tobacco Others Food
Income (adult) 0.976 1.649 0.904 0.433 0.632 0.961
Income (children) 1.061 1.154 0.810 -0.008 1.621 1.016
Meat -0.956 0.026 -0.003 -0.049 -0.006 -0.049
Clothing -0.098 -1.934 0.125 -0.112 0.020 0.196
Housing 0.041 0.437 -1.805 0.291 0.225 0.096
Alcohol/Tobacco 0.063 -0.152 0.274 0.582 -0.269 0.076
Others -0.085 0.433 0.512 -1.084 -1.415 0.386
Food -0.002 0.101 -0.004 -0.054 0.011 -1.030
According to their size, clothing and housing are the most elastic good to price
changes, while meat and food are the less elastic. As for income elasticities, which
could estimated individually. For the adult, the most elastic good is clothing, while,
as expected alcohol and tobacco have the smallest elasticity. For the child, the
larger elasticity belongs to “other goods”, all expected results since this category
contains also educational and recreational expenses. From a policy perspective, this
is an important result since it means that more resources devoted to children in the
household would end in investment in human capital. The less elastic good is alcohol
and tobacco, which is around zero. Since the child is under five, it is clear that he/she
does not consume this good, so the elasticity should be expected to be null.
To properly interpret the parameters of the sharing rule, it must remembered
that ma(·) = m(·) and mc(·) = −m(·), hence the estimated parameters refer to the
sharing rule of the adult, while the same parameters’ values have the opposite effect
on the sharing rule of the child. Estimate of the parameters of the sharing function
are reported in Table 3.5. They show that the ratio between the prices of adult and
child clothing influences positively the propensity to allocate resources in favour of
adults. This suggests that subsiding child specific goods would not have a positive
influence on children’s welfare because this would increase the price ratio reducing
the share of resources of the child. The age differential between female and male
(age ratio) influences negatively child welfare: small differences in age between the
partners may indicate a balanced couple with more caring for their son/daughter.
Even if to receive a monetary support (Ndihma Economike) has no influence on
child welfare, attending a preschool programs influences the distribution of resources
within the family in favour of the child. This evidence seems to favour in-kind
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Table 3.5: Adult Sharing Rule Parameters in m(·)
Ratio between adult and child exclusive goods 3.012***
(1.164)
Dummy for “other than Muslim or Orthodox” 0.155
(0.152)
Dummy for child chronic illness or disability 0.109
(0.152)
Dummy for both parents employed -0.090
(0.145)
Ratio between spouse and head age 1.460***
(0.548)
Ratio between spouse and head education -0.108
(0.191)
Dummy for Ndhime Ekonomike beneficiary 0.202
(0.144)
Preschool (“2” if all the children attend, “1” if at least one,“0” if nobody) -0.624***
(0.106)
benefits rather than cash transfers for the welfare of children, at least from an intra-
household perspective. The NE cash transfer has proven to be quite non-effective in
alleviating poverty (see Chapter II) and in supporting child welfare in families with
young children, despite the fact that it is the only family allowance program operated
in the country. It is possible to conclude that it has an equal negative effect on adult
and child being, it is no effective for the household welfare as a whole and for the
vulnerable individuals within the household.
To add further details to the analysis, figures 3.1 and 3.2, show the relative shar-
ing rule, expressed as the ratio between the expenditure for child and total household
expenditure (φc(·)/y). These pictures are drawn by means of non-parametric regres-
sions of the sharing rule on total household expenditure.
Figure 3.1 shows that share of child/adult expenditure goes from 21% for poor
households to 39% for higher income households. This difference between poor and
rich families is mostly driven by urban households, in fact Figure 3.2 shows that
urban children in the richest deciles have the highest share of resources. The socio-
economic status influences positively the attitude toward children for households
living in the cities. Instead, in rural areas the distribution of resources within the
family is constant along the distribution of the household welfare. This could be
driven by the scarce development of rural areas in Albania: even if the household
is rich, there may not be much to do for children with that money because of the
absence of toy-shops, recreational and cultural activity centers, fashion shops.
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Figure 3.1: Semi-parametric plot of the Child “Sharing Rule” by Total Expenditure
- Whole Sample
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Figure 3.2: Semi-parametric plot of the Child “Sharing Rule” by Total Expenditure
- Urban/Rural
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3.4.2 Child welfare, inequality and the effects of public transfers on
young children
The estimated value of the “sharing rule” refer to an hypothetical equivalent house-
hold composed by two members: one adult and one child. In other words individual
consumption of the adult and the child, the source of sharing rule identification, are
rescaled to take account number of adults and children in the household. To say
something more general about regarding children’s welfare and the effects on intra-
household inequality, it is necessary to recover the real individual expenditure of each
child in the family, given the “sharing rule” that has been estimated.
In order to have proper measure of individual child welfare the following equa-
tion, which rescales back the “sharing rule” to obtain the true values of individual
consumption taking into account the real household composition, since the “sharing
rule” is estimated on an one adult/one child equivalent household:
Sc =
ρc
ncρc + na(1− ρc) y (3.28)
where ρc is the estimated child’s relative “sharing rule”, computed as φc/y, nc and
na are the number of children and of adults in the household. The resulting value is
the actual share of total expenditure of each child and can be used to perform poverty
and inequality analyses of child welfare. In other words this is a sort of household
specific equivalence scale, where the scales not only depend on household composition
and/or characteristics, but also on intra-household resource distribution.
The following analysis focused on child welfare, ignoring what happens to adults.
Moreover the sample is compose only by children under five, hence the results are very
specific to this group of study and cannot be generalized to all Albanian children. A
more general analysis with gender differentiation and a proper modeling of children
of different ages is planned in a future work.
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of child welfare using the estimated share of
children’s consumption (continuous line) and the per-capita consumption measure
(dashed line), computed assuming an equal distribution among household’s mem-
bers. The kernel density distribution reveals that child welfare is distributed more
unequally if also intra-household allocation is considered and that the average level
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Figure 3.3: Individual Child Expenditure Distribution: “Sharing Rule” vs. Per-
capita Consumption
of child consumption is lower. The plotted Cumulative Distribution Functions of
individual consumption shares and per-capita consumption show that taking into
account intra-household inequality, child consumption is smaller both on average and
along the whole distribution. Just to give a crude number, inequality in child con-
sumption measured by the Gini index shifts from a 0.286 computed using per-capita
consumption to a 0.382 computed using the “sharing rule”. Intra-household inequal-
ity accounts for almost ten percentage points of the Gini index for children under five
in Albania. The estimated “sharing rule” exploit the information on expenditure for
children within the household. This procedure improves a simple per-capita index
where an equal distribution of expenditure among household’s members is assured.
Turning to policy issues, economists have traditionally been skeptical about in-
kind income support policy measures, viewing cash transfers as superior in terms of
recipients’ utility, since unitary models assume that the resources within the house-
hold are allocated optimally according to individual needs. From the estimated
“sharing rule” (Table 3.5), instead, shows that family allowances have no effects in
the proportion of resources allocated to young children while preschool participation
(an in-kind transfer) has a positive impact.
To explore further the effects of public transfers on children’s welfare, figure
3.4 shows the children “sharing rule” ρc of two groups of families: one with no
child attending preschool and the other with at least one child currently attending
preschool. The “sharing rule” of attending children is nearly constant along the
consumption distribution and close to 0.4. On the other hand, the “sharing rule”
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Figure 3.4: Semi-parametric plot of the Child “Sharing Rule” by Total Expenditure
- Impact of Attending Preschool on the “Sharing Rule”
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for non-attending children U shaped, where the lowest and highest income families
seem to take more care for their children. The difference in the two “sharing rules”
is significant along the whole income distribution, in line with the correspondent
“sharing rule” parameter.
Figure 3.5: Semi-parametric plot of the Child “Sharing Rule” by Total Expenditure
- Impact of Ndihma Economike on the “Sharing Rule”
As to the effects on intra-household inequality of public cash transfers, Figure 3.5
shows that the poor household, well targeted and effectively in needs of a minimum
income, do not show a significantly different behaviour whether they receive or not
the benefit. Nonetheless, it seems that the share of aid that would go to the child is
rather low, around 0.2. On the other hand, the “leakage” households (that is those
households that are not poor but beneficiary) behave more egoistically toward their
children with respect to similar households not receiving the benefit. These results
show once again the negative effects of bad targeting on the program’s effectiveness
if one considers behavioural responses.
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These considerations on cash transfers are partial, both because the reference
sample is not representative of the whole Albanian population and because the anal-
ysis is subject to further improvements manly to take into account gender inequality
in the estimation of the demand system. However, the use of collective models for
welfare analysis is superior simply because there are too many aspects that with an
unitary approach cannot be taken into account.
3.5 Concluding remarks
This Chapter applies the collective framework to the measurement of intra-household
inequality to study child welfare in Albania. Albanian households have been deeply
affected by the transition to a market economy from a regime that revolutionized
the previous patriarchal tradition. The effect of the transition seems to be that of
bringing back those traditional values, with a marginal role for women and negligence
toward childhood, especially in rural area. At the same time, the household structure
is changing deeply since migration has affected strongly family’s equilibria. To open
the family’s black-box in this case is highly relevant to study individual welfare and
evaluate the impact of public policies on the intra-household distribution of resources.
The analysis is conducted on Albanian households with children under five, using
consumption variables present in the Albanian Living Standard Measurement Survey.
Is has been shown that intra-household inequality measured on the share of ex-
penditure plays an important role in determining child welfare. The Gini index for
children increases when child welfare is computed using the “sharing rule” method
versus the per-capita income method. It has also been tested whether receiving
public transfers induces a modification of the “sharing rule” with respect to similar
households who do not receive benefit from these transfers. A distinction has been
made between cash transfers and in-kind transfers, the latter been represented by
preschool attendance (which is paid by the government). In-kind transfers are likely
to improve the condition of children within the household for all income level. On
the other hand, means testing cash transfers do not seem to ameliorate the relative
position of children within the household, while if cash transfers go to non poor
families intra-household inequality between adults and children may worsen. This
finding suggests that if properly conceived, in-kind transfers can be effective, both
because well targeted and because they fulfil precise needs. Attending preschool for
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young children is on the contrary a way of increasing share of resources dedicated to
children within the family and this finding suggests the goodness of this particular
in-kind transfer.
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Chapter 4
Children’s Schooling and
Parental Migration: Empirical
Evidence on the “Left Behind”
Generation in Albania
This chapter investigates the long-term effects of parental migration abroad on the
welfare of children left behind in Albania. Although parents’ migration usually bene-
fits children economically, the lack of parental care may cause relational and psycho-
logical problems that may affect children’s welfare in the long term. The phenomenon
of children left behind - mainly by fathers - is very relevant in Albania where mi-
gration has represented the only viable way to cope with increasing poverty and the
absence of public resources for sustaining households’ incomes. Using detailed infor-
mation on family migration drawn from the Living Standard Measurement Survey
for 2005, binary and multiple choice models are applied to evaluate the decision to
send children to school and the school progression of older children and adolescents.
A duration analysis of school participation with both discrete and continuous time
models is then performed. The results show that past parental migration has a neg-
ative effect on children’s welfare. On one side it negatively affects school attendance
in the long run with higher hazard rates of school drop-out for the children left be-
hind. On the other side, there are no effects on the share of expenditure devoted
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to children in the household. These results are robust to the change of econometric
techniques and model specifications.
4.1 Migration and child welfare
The implicit assumption in most of the existing studies on migration and child welfare
is that migration only affects children’s outcomes by alleviating household’s budget
constraints thanks to remittances. Several recent empirical studies have shown the
positive effects of remittances on human capital investment. These studies follow
the literature on the schooling of children in developing countries, which has empha-
sized the role of family income constraints in explaining differences in child welfare
and human capital development. They extend this approach to migration studies,
evaluating the impact of remittances as an additional source of income. For example
Edwards and Ureta (2003) in a study based on data from El Salvador find that re-
mittances reduce school dropout hazard rates and Calero et al. (2009) similarly show
that remittances increase school enrolment and reduce child labour in Ecuador.
The theoretical literature on “beneficial brain drain” (Stark et al., 1997) suggests
an additional point of view on the relation between migration and human capital:
the prospect of higher returns to education in a foreign country boosts investment
in human capital at home. In this line of research Stark and Wang (2002) develop
a theoretical analysis of how migration can substitute the public provision of public
subsidies for the formation of human capital.
On the other hand, recent studies provide mixed evidence on whether migration
has a net positive or negative effect on child development. The positive impact on
liquidity constraints deriving from income earned abroad are not without side effects.
The parents’ absence may be a psychological cost and change the decision-making
process within the household. When a household member leaves, intra-household
duties and responsibilities may change, and it may happen that children of migrant
parents spend less time on school-related activities and that their involvement in
work tasks increases. Thus, they may drop out of school or be held back a grade
or more due to non-completion or unsatisfactory completion of their work. Recent
empirical works have addressed this issue, finding negative impacts on child wel-
fare that emerge during or after the migration process. Hildebrandt and McKenzie
(2005) show that migration negatively affects the likelihood of breastfeeding and vac-
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cinations; similarly, Kiros and White (2004) find that children of migrant mothers
in Ethiopia have less chances of receiving full immunization coverage than children
of non-migrant mothers. McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) examining the impact of
migration on educational attainment in rural Mexico, find that living in a migrant
household lowers the chances of children completing high school. They attribute
these outcomes to side side effects of migration and in particular to the fact that the
absence of parents in the household due to migration could lead to reduce invest-
ment in their children’s education. The WB (2007) claims there is a negative effect
of migration on children’s outcomes in Albania: in rural areas, daughters (aged 6-22
years) of permanent international migrants have lower enrolment rates than do those
living in households without international migrants. It is also found that households
with permanent international migrants spend less on education.
If the main theoretical argument for the negative impact on child welfare of
migration is parental absence, the major limitation of the above analyses is that
they are not able to disentangle the effect of parental migration from the child’s
own migration experience, mostly because of poor survey information. Liang and
Chen (2007) address the phenomenon of children left behind, distinguishing children
involved in permanent migration from children who remained at home in China:
they find that the first have a higher likelihood of being enrolled in school. Cortes
(2006), focusing on the Republic of Moldova, finds a statistical association between
the increase in juvenile crime rates and the rise in the number of children left behind.
Parental migration when the child is left in the sending country has longer-term
implications for child’s development and their future life. These include, for example,
changes in household structure and responsibilities leading to more pressure on older
children to help in the household or to assist with agricultural duties and thus to
neglect their schooling. Effects such as the break-up of the family and a lack of
parental supervision and social interaction are also considered. The disruptive effects
on family structure can change the leadership of the family, giving more power to
older males who are less educated and less prone to understand the importance of
investment in human capital as regards their grandchildren (Ginther and Pollak,
2004). Thus, the possible long-term effects of migration might cancel out the effects
of a temporary improvement in household incomes.
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4.1.1 Parental absence and children’s schooling
In the economic literature, the research on the consequences of parental absence
has largely been focused on the aftermath of divorce and separation and therefore
primarily considers the consequences of the biological father’s absence from the child’s
home. Among these works is that of Ermisch (2008), which presents a theoretical
model of households with a non-resident father dealing with the frequency of the
child-father contact. The author argues that the contact of the non-resident father
with his child is important because it may directly affect the child’s welfare and
have a longer-run impact on the child in terms of his/her emotional and cognitive
development. The study by Del Boca (2003) focuses on the welfare of children
with divorced parents and calls for extensive public support devoted to children
made vulnerable by divorce, while Waldfogel (2002) evaluates outcomes for children
younger than five years when mothers are kept out of the household by job constraints
concluding that public supply of early childhood interventions can make a difference
in improving outcomes for children. Theoretical and empirical analyses assessing
from an economic point of view the impact on children of parental absence are also
those considering the child’s orphan status in developing countries. Among them, the
empirical study by Yamano et al. (2006) on Uganda’s orphans focuses on outcomes
for primary school children and adolescents. They estimate schooling enrollment and
school progression, finding greater negative effects for older children.
4.1.2 Children left behind by parents who have migrated abroad
Albania is a good field laboratory to study the effects of parental migration on
children left behind, for several reasons. First, an analysis of schooling is of particular
interest in Albania, since in the last fifteen years a significant drop in enrolment,
especially for secondary school has been observed. Moreover the importance of family
income in determining school enrolment and attendance increased during the 90s.
According to Danaj et al. (2005) the drop in enrolment is due also to a lack of
interest caused by the perception of low quality of education and distance to school,
as well as new cultural barriers to female education1. Second, in the past fifteen
1With the transition, the traditional patriarchal values of the Albanian household acquired re-
newed relevance with a dominant role of men over female and consequentely less attention to the
investment in human capital for girls. The household is the only institution in the country able to
protect vulnerable individuals, however, at the same it has been experiencing big cultural changes
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years, one in three households has experienced a migration abroad, with a positive
impact on household consumption and poverty reduction due to a massive inflow of
remittances (WB, 2007). Third, the share of children left behind by migrant parents
is relevant. A recent analysis by UNICEF (2009) reports that the phenomenon is
substantial in Albania and the Republic of Moldova. While in the latter country
children are in general more affected, the incidence of the phenomenon is larger in
Albania if one focuses only on young children. The main difference between the two
countries is that the “left-behind” phenomenon in Moldova is associated with the so-
called “care drain” to western European countries, which means that large numbers
of children are being left behind by their mothers, probably with even tougher effects.
In Albania, instead, migration has been male-dominated and what is observed in the
majority of cases is a father’s absence. An additional reason for choosing Albania is
the absence of public subsides supporting households with children where members
are emigrated abroad (see WB, 2006, Chapter I and Chapter II) which makes the
possibility to isolate the effect of parental migration on children’s outcomes easier.
Features of the data for Albania are fundamental for the scope of the analysis.
Unlike other surveys, ALSMS 2005 allows to reconstruct the “left behind” episodes
of children in the migration history of their parents. This gives two advantages
with respect to previous analyses: the status of the child during parental migration
can be consistently recovered, and even if the survey is cross-section, a retrospective
information on migration is collected, so that the long-run effects of the phenomenon,
can be effectively identified. Children’s wellbeing indicators that may have been
affected by the number and length of the episodes in which they have been left behind
can be reconstructed. Following Pudney et al. (2006), the present underinvestment in
human capital, in the form of hazard rate of dropping out of school, is used to proxy
vulnerability to poverty. The focus is on preschooling, primary and secondary school
attendance and a grade-for-age indicator for children and adolescents estimating the
risk of school drop-out using survival analysis. Additionally the impact of parental
migration on expenditure devoted to children living in the household is evaluated
to asses the monetary welfare of children. The absence of young adults emigrated
abroad may shift the precarious equilibrium of tradition and modernity within the
in the last fifty years, with consequent problems for women and the youth in the always difficult
balance between traditional norms and modernity (see Gjonca et al., 2008, for an analysis of the
evolution of Albanian household).
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Albanian household and, as consequence a reduction on children-related expenditure
may be observed.
The analysis is conducted on three separate groups: children under the age of five,
primary school-age children and adolescents. As to the econometric method, probit
models to evaluate the decision to send young children to pre-school are applied. The
school progression of older children and adolescents is then studied using an ordered
choice model. Finally, the analysis focused on schooling attendance and performed
a survival analysis of participation to schooling.
The study is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the data and variables
used in the analysis, Section 4.3 explain the econometric tools used and Section 4.4
shows the results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Data and variables
The main reason for the lack of research on the impact of migration on children is the
scarcity of detailed data in the same survey on both international migration at the
household level and children’s welfare within the family. The data for Albania used
in this study contain detailed information on the children-left-behind by parents who
migrate abroad, with retrospective information that allows to carry out a dynamic
analysis of the phenomenon and to explore its long-term effects. The analysis of this
chapter is based on the 2005 Albanian Living Standards Measurement Study survey.
Unlike other household surveys, the LSMS provides unusually detailed information
on the migration of both current and former household members. Moreover, the
Albanian LSMS includes information on a wide range of demographic and socio-
economic characteristics at household and individual levels, along with a community
questionnaire with information on local services and socio-economic conditions. A
total of 3,640 households were interviewed, corresponding to a national representa-
tive sample of 17,302 individuals, 33.75% of which are children (under 18 years old).
Even if the questionnaire is very complete and contains detailed information on edu-
cation, health, social capital and consumption expenditure, the survey has a limited
focus on children, and it is difficult to recover qualitative child wellbeing indicators.
For instance, there is good information on service availability, quality and appropri-
ateness, but limited information on the demand for schooling and factors influencing
this demand. However, the migration module provides detailed information on the
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individuals’ migration history and behaviour toward children during the migration
episodes.
A sample of 5,834 children is drawn from the 2005 LSMS, and the analysis is
conducted on three different sub-samples. First, a sample of 783 children aged from
3 to 5 (pre-school age) of whom 56% are boys, 41% were attending pre-school in
2005 and 18% had been left behind by a parent migrated abroad for at least one
month during their lives. Second, a sample of 2,575 compulsory school-age children
equally distributed between boys and girls, with an enrolment rate of 90%, who 22%
of whom had been left behind. Third, a sample of 1,898 adolescents aged from 14 to
18, 67% of whom were attending secondary school and up to 19% had experienced
an episode of parental absence due to parental international migration.
4.2.1 Child consumption, school attendance and school progression
The chosen children’s wellbeing indicators that may be affected by the “left-behind”
episodes relate to consumption and education (see in Table 4.1). The per capita child
consumption indicator is the sum of household expenditure dedicated to children
(wear, footwear and education) divided by the number of children in the household.
Using this indicator a dummy variable is created, taking value “1” for the deprived
children and “0” for others2. A better solution would be to use monetary child
welfare identified with collective models as in Chapter III for 2002. However this
cannot be done with 2005 because of the lack of detailed data.
Preschool attendance is used as an indicator of multidimensional child wellbeing.
Empirical studies focusing on developed countries have shown the importance of early
childhood programs for skill formation. For example, Heckman and Masterov (2007)
show that investing in early childhood programs is a kind of public investment not
affected by the equity-efficiency trade-off. The authors also focus on social benefits
of pre-school, especially for disadvantaged children. In developing countries, pre-
school attendance is typically considered important for monitoring children’s health
and nutrition status, especially when children are poor (see Behrman et al., 2004;
Alderman et al., 2006). Two types of variable are used: the first is a dummy variable
taking value “1” if the child is currently attending a pre-school program; the second
2We perform a poverty analysis by age groups using a relative poverty line at one half of the
median. The variable indicates those children who are deprived in terms of child expenditures
relatively to others of the same age.
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variable is a truncated variable reporting hours of pre-school attendance during the
week3. This information is recorded only for children between 3 and 5 years old
which leaves children younger than three out of the analysis4.
For school attendance of children aged 6 to 13 and of adolescents, “school pro-
gression” is the chosen indicator of education. Following Orazem and King (2008),
first school participation is analysed using the questions on both enrolment5 and
attendance6; then the dichotomic variable is transformed into a variable multinomial
for not attending, attending with delay, in-time attendance 7; for the scope of the
analysis, it is important to capture these differences. Following the authors the out-
come of enrollment with delay reflects a confluence of factors including supply side
problems, school governance and household demand8. Within the primary school
sample, 9% of children are not attending school at all and up to 22% are attending
with delay, while in the adolescent sample the share who does not attend a secondary
school program is 32%, and that of those who attend with delay is 15%.
To derive an indicator of child social skills, detailed survey information on social
capital is used like, for instance, the number of informal groups the household is
member of, or the number of close friends. Unfortunately, this module is responded
by the household head, and this variable refers to the whole family. Thus, it is not a
specific proxy children’s networks or social capital. Nevertheless social capital may
be used as household feature among the explanatory variables.
3The common use of enrolment status as a dummy dependent variable in modelling school at-
tendance has been criticized recently because it collapses the schooling decision into a dichotomous
variable reflecting different number of hours allocated to school (Orazem and King, 2008).
4Preschool attendance is also relevant for younger children (Doyle et al., 2009); however, in
Albania, there are no public programs devoted to children at this age
5“Did you enroll in school this academic year?”
6“Are you currently attending school?”
7Orazem and King (2008) note that two children of the same age who are both enrolled could
be in different grades because one may have started school later or may have dropped out for a
short time or repeated a year. To proxy delayed attendance variable indicating the “theoretical”
maximum number of months a child should have been attending at each level and year, compared it
with the effective number of months each child has been attending school to reach their level. The
multinomial variable takes “0” if the child is not attending school, “1” if he/she attending but has
experienced delayed enrollment or repeated a year, and “2” for in-time enrolment.
8As noted in the previous section when a household member leaves, intra-household duties and
responsibilities may change, and children of migrant parents may spend less time on school-related
activities.
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4.2.2 Migration’s history and the retrospective data on the “left
behind” episodes
The explanatory variables applied in this analysis may be classified into five groups:
variables that have to do with a child “left behind” episode, variables related to
children’s individual characteristics, variables regarding household socio-economic
conditions, territorial variables and policy variables.
The main indicator of a left-behind episode is the variable “months of left behind”,
shown in table 4.1. The variable has been constructed using from the module on past
migration episodes, where returned individuals returned are asked if their children
were living with them abroad or if they had remained in Albania9. The durations
of the most recent and of the first migration episodes are recorded, so that they
can be summed up to derive the total amount of months in which a child has been
left behind. The variable has been created without distinguishing between maternal
and paternal migration. The observations referring to absence of the mother are too
few to be used separately from fathers absence so they are pooled. Children left
in the past by parents who had returned (and were present at the moment of the
survey) amount to 1,160. Moreover, the survey informs if any of the non-present
members (children or spouses of the head of household) were living away from their
children at the moment of the interview. In integrating the variables of past “left
behind” episodes with the information on children presently left behind, almost all
the “left behind” episodes from child birth10 to the moment of the interview have
been recovered. Additionally, this variable, when used for children older than 511, has
been adjusted for school-age children, eliminating the left-behind episodes that may
have occurred before school creating th variable ”months left behind while attending
school” (Table 4.1). The variable has been transformed to “0” for these cases to
control for temporal consequentiality when estimating the effect of a left-behind
9The question is “Were any of your children living with you during your stay abroad?”, thus,
for those who responded “No, lived in this household”, it is sure that all of the children remained
at home during the migration. Inversely, for the 171 individuals who responded that any of their
children had emigrated with them, it was not possible to control for brothers and sisters’ remaining
at home. Because of the 171 “yes” cases, 141 referred to the migration of both parents, it can be
assumed that nearly all of the children were with the parents in those cases. In conclusion, there
are 30 cases in which the number of children left behind may have been underestimated.
10The migration episodes that are considered in the analysis are only those after the beginning of
Albanian transition (1990)
11For children older than 5 the survey reports information on the year they had left school.
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episode on schooling attendance12.
A limit of the survey is that the question about children left behind was asked
only for the most recent episode of migration and for the very first. It is not possible
to know if the father or the mother have left their child more than twice. For those
individuals in the survey who experienced other migration episodes between the first
and the last, it is not know if they had children who had been left behind13.
Among the individual variables, are age in months, gender, years of pre-school
attended for school-age children, educational background and the employment sta-
tus of the mother and father. Cultural and religious variables, together with main
household characteristics, are also used in the analysis. The logarithm of per-capita
household consumption is among them, from which child expenditure (education
and wear) has been eliminated to avoid problems of endogeneity, and also value of
remittances during the year of the survey14. Variables indicating the distance of the
household from many services are also used.
As residence variable, dummies for “Tirana”, “coastal rural/urban area” , “cen-
tral rural/urban” area and “mountain urban/rural area” according to the first strat-
ification unit of the survey sample are used15.
The effect of public intervention is also controlled for using two main variables.
The first is a dummy for the child who lives in a household that participates in a
mean tested family allowances program (the Ndhdime Ekonomike). The second is a
dummy for the presence of the pre-school, primary school or secondary school in the
municipality16.
An additional variable is the occurrence of a particular shock that may have
affected the household during the transition. Households are requested to report the
exact year of the shock. In particular, the following shocks are taken into account:
12For this adjustment the question regarding the last year of school attended by those who have
dropped out has been used.
13However, only 4 children in the sample who had been left behind the first and the last time have
their parents with a third migration episode, and thus all periods of parental absence, except these
4, for which the duration of parental absence may have been underestimated, cab be reasonably be
assumed to have been captured.
14Note that this variable being current, not controlling for the economic effect of past migration on
present child wellbeing. The variable “remittances” is used here to control for the general economic
effects of migration, which are also likely to be persistent over time thought savings.
15It is not possible to use a smaller territorial unit in order to keep statistical properties of a large
sample in the econometric analysis
16This information is shown from the community questionnaire.
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the death of an earner within the family, a job loss for the household head, the
physical destruction of the house and significant monetary losses due to the financial
“pyramid crisis” of 1997.
The next session, describes the estimation strategy. School attendance is mod-
elled first, and then the child’s welfare based on consumption.
4.3 Estimation strategy
Modelling school attendance required a specific attention for each grade of education.
Preschool attendance is clearly different from modelling the choice of abandoning
secondary school. Moreover, the issue of late enrolment or delayed progression needs
further special attention. For these reasons a series of estimates with different models
are proposed, with the aim of robust evidence on the correlation between migration
and the state of children left at home.
Children in the pre-school age are first considered. Since pre-school attendance
is not mandatory in Albania, the choice of sending children at pre-school is made by
parents. The choice to be made is twofold: sending or not the children to pre-school
and for how many hours. Moreover, there could be an endogeneity problem with
the labour supply choice of the parents, especially the mothers’. To take account of
these issues three models are estimated. First, participation to pre-school is estimated
using a binary outcome model, namely, a Probit model (Bliss, 1935) . The outcome
variable is pre-school attendance for children aged 3-5, defined as
Y =
1 if childred attends preschool0 if not.
The probability of choosing to send children to pre-school depends on a set of ex-
planatory variables X
Pr[Y = 1|X] = Φ(X ′β),
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
and parameters β are estimated by Maximum Likelihood.
The Probit model, is naturally extended to the Tobit model (Tobin, 1958), which
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is used to model the choice of pre-school hours. Here the choice is not restricted to a
binary outcome, as in the case of pre-school attendance, but it cannot be estimated
with an OLS since it is lower bounded to zero (it is not possible to observe negative
hours of pre-school attendance). The Tobit model extends the Probit allowing for
the outcome variable Y to take other values than 1 or 0, according to an unobserved
latent variable (Y ∗):
Y =
Y ∗ if Y ∗ > 0 hours of preschool0 if Y ∗ ≤ 0 if child do not attend preschool,
where the latent variable Y ∗ depends on a sex of regressors X according to
Y ∗ = X ′β + u.
The parameters β are again estimated by Maximum Likelihood. The results of the
Probit and Tobit models estimates are presented in Table 4.2.
To look at the possible endogeneity problem of the mother’s labour supply choice,
a bivariate Probit model is estimated. Two choices are modelled simultaneously in
such a way that the two binary outcomes, say Y1 and Y2, depend on two latent
variables Y ∗1 and Y ∗2 that can be correlated, i.e.Y1 = 1 if Y ∗1 > 0Y2 = 1 if Y ∗2 > 0
whereY ∗1 = X ′β1 + e1Y ∗2 = X ′β2 + e2
and the error terms e1 and e2 are distributes as a bivariate standard normal variable(
e1
e2
)
|X ∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
1 σ
σ 1
))
.
Estimates, obtained by Maximum Likelihood, are presented in Table 4.3 .
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For older children, the problem becomes more complicated. Primary school is
mandatory, hence participation should be almost universal. However, several cases
of delay in school participation and a few of school drop out are observed. On the
other hand secondary schools are not mandatory, hence many more cases of drop
out are observed. These differences suggest that it is safer to conduct two separate
analyses for mandatory school children (aged 6 to 13 years old) and secondary school
children (aged 14 to 18 years old). For both groups however the estimation techniques
are the same.
For these children, school participation is modelled in three stages: 0 for non-
participation, 1 for delayed participation and 2 for regular participation. This vari-
able is called “school progression”. The idea is to have different degrees of failure
of school participation, which include a delay in the completion of studies and the
departure from schooling.
This situation is modeled using an Ordered Logistic Regression (McCullagh, 1980)
and Multinomial Logistic Regression (Luce, 1959). The difference between the two is
that Ordered Logit assumes a hierarchy for the dependent variable categories mean-
ing, for example, that 1 is better than 0 and 2 is better than 1. This seems to be the
case given how the schooling participation variable is constructed, but the processes
of school drop out and delayed progression may be independent. For this reason,
the Multinomial Logit model has also been estimated, setting the baseline state as 2
(regular schooling participation) and estimating the probability of quitting or delay-
ing school using separate equations. The use of Multinomial Logit model confirms
Ordered Logistic’s results thus it has been chosen to use the last one assuming that
a hierarchy for the dependent variable categories meaning (enrolment with delay is
better than drop-out). The results for both primary school children’s and secondary
school children’s schooling progression are presented in Table 4.5 .
To complete the statical analysis, the possible effects that being left behind could
have on their welfare are studied; welfare is expressed here as a dummy variable for
deprivation depending on per-child expenditure on children goods (see Section II for
details). Results are presented in Table 4.6.
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4.3.1 Survival in the school system using duration models
In order to deepen the analysis of the relation between school drop out and having
been left behind, a series of duration models have been estimated (see Jenkins, 2004,
for a exhaustive review) in line with the work of Edwards and Ureta (2003) who esti-
mated the impact of remittances on school dropout. This choices has been dictated
by the actual structure of the data. In fact, differently by Edwards and Ureta (2003)
who not dispose of retrospective data, both the relevant episodes, namely dropping
out of school and having been left behind can be recovered from the migration history
of parent and education history of children available in the Albanian LSMS. With
these data, the choice of duration models applied to the schooling period appears
particularly appealing.
The observed lifetime corresponds to the time that the children spend in school
(spell), and death corresponds to the observed drop out on the part of the child
(failure). The probability of quitting the spell of education (failure) may be influenced
by a number of exogenous factors.
Before proceeding to describe the estimated models, it is useful to present the
basic concepts related to survival analysis to clarify the differences between them.
The length of a spell for an individual is stochastic and denoted by T . Its cumulative
distribution function is F (t) = Pr (T ≤ t), and its probability density function is
f(t) = ∂F (t)/∂t. The survival function S(t) is defined as 1− F (t) and denotes, in a
broad sense, the probability of survival up to t.
The hazard function can be defined as the rate at which the spell is completed
at time t given that it has not been completed before t, i.e.
θ (t) =
f(t)
1− F (t) =
f(t)
S(t)
.
The value taken by the hazard function at a particular value of t is called the
hazard rate.
The hazard function is in some sense the heart of econometric duration analysis
for several reasons. For instance, the fact that in economics the focus is often placed
on the rate at which the subject leaves the state at t, in particular in trying to explain
the hazard at t in terms of external conditions, suggests that one should build all
theory around θ(t). Whatever the reason, the consequence is that different models
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of duration arise from different specifications of the hazard function θ(t).
The first fundamental problem in estimating θ(t) is whether t should be consid-
ered a continuous variable or a discrete variable. In principle, almost all spells of
interest would be a function of continuous time but are recorded in a convenient
time span as days, months or years. In practice, discrete time modelling is used
when the length of the spell takes few values, such that a continuous time modeling
could be a bad approximation of the data generation process. Secondly, θ(t) may be
characterized by the shape of the functional form chosen. This can be parametric,
as in the Weibull, Exponential, Gompertz, Log-Logistic, Lognormal and Generalized
Gamma models or semi-parametric.
A particular class of duration models is called “proportional hazard”. These
models are characterized by the fact that they satisfy a separability assumption
θ(t,X) = θ0(t)exp(β′X) = θ0(t)λ
where X is a vector of covariates; θ0(t) is the “baseline hazard function”, which
depends on t but not on X (and hence is common to all persons); and λ is a person-
specific non-negative function of covariates X, which scales the baseline hazard func-
tion. When the estimation of θ0 is conducted non-parametrically, the model is called
Cox’s Proportional Hazard model (Cox, 1972). This model is particularly attractive
because of the flexibility in the shape of the baseline hazard function and is cho-
sen for the first estimates of school attendance. The results, estimated by Partial
Likelihood, are presented in Table 4.7.
One of the possible weaknesses of this approach is that it may not take sufficiently
into account the heterogeneity of individuals (often referred to as frailty). If the
vector of covariates X is not sufficient to explain the differences in hazard rates
among individuals, estimates may be biased. Frailty models overcome this issue by
adding an individual-specific error term, as in the random intercepts model. In order
to estimate this additional error term, a functional form for its distribution should
be specified (common options are the Gamma function and the Inverse Gaussian
distribution). Because a Cox estimator with a full frailty implementation is not yet
available, the Weibull model is used here to look into the heterogeneity problem.
The estimates are presented in Table 4.7.
Another possible source of error is the fact that some individual characteristics
110
may vary over time. In this case, children have been left behind in a particular
moment in their lives, so their hazard rates may have changed in response to this
variation. This problem can be solved by including time-varying variables in the
estimation of duration models. If a child has been left for one year, than their parent
may come back, and leave again and so on. If this is the case, the previous models
are likely to be a poor approximation of reality. A possible solution consists in
estimating a discrete time duration model that, takes into account the precise point
in time when the child has been left behind during the spell of education.
The results of the discrete time Cox model17 are presented in Table 4.818.
The next section describes the empirical strategy and presents the results by
children’s age groups.
4.4 The impact of parental migration on children’s and
adolescents’ schooling
This section presents the estimates of the impact of being left behind on some chil-
dren’s wellbeing indicators by age cohort. Section 4.4.1 deals with preschool atten-
dance of young children controlling for the joint decision of labour supply of the
mothers. Section 4.4.2 presents the estimated of school drop outs and delay for chil-
dren in primary and secondary schools. Section 4.4.3 describes how being left behind
may influence the probability of being deprivated in terms of child-related expendi-
ture. Finally the results of the duration analysis of school attendance are presented
in Section 4.4.4.
4.4.1 Preschool attendance and mother’s labour
Table 4.2 shows the results for the equations modelling the decision to send young
children to pre-school. It turns out that there is no influence of parental migration
episodes on preschool attendance and hours of pre-school. The age of the child is a
relevant variable in the model: as expected older children are more likely to attend
17In order to estimate discrete time duration models, it is necessary to reorganize the dataset in
panel form, such that each individual is observed for each time point.
18The variable has been corrected in this case for the contemporaneity of the effects and takes
the value “1” for a left-behind episode the year observed in the data and the next year as a lagged
variable.
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Table 4.2: Preschool Attendance (children 3-5 years old)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit (Marginal Effects) Tobit (Coefficients)
Sex -0.028 (0.039) -1.313 (1.823)
Age in months in 2005 0.008*** (0.002) 0.340*** (0.089)
Months left behind 0.000 (0.006) -0.002 (0.299)
Time (months) from the last parent’s return 0.004 (0.003) 0.142 (0.116)
HH is muslim 0.051 (0.040) 1.577 (1.957)
Children under 18 in the household 0.016 (0.018) 0.861 (0.883)
HH number of elder 0.009 (0.026) 0.451 (1.257)
Mother’s education (level) 0.057*** (0.017) 2.303*** (0.770)
Father’s education (level) 0.024 (0.015) 1.536** (0.697)
Female hh head -0.110 (0.076) -5.817 (4.199)
HH social capital (n of groups belongs to) 0.027 (0.029) 0.447 (1.359)
Log of consumption (no education and child wear) 0.045 (0.041) 2.317 (1.969)
HH has ownership of dwelling 0.107** (0.053) 5.323* (2.789)
Distance from the nearest school -0.012*** (0.002) -0.536*** (0.102)
Log of monthly remittances (lek) 0.003 (0.006) 0.004 (0.276)
Log of NE transfer -0.004 (0.007) -0.245 (0.318)
Mother has a job 0.008 (0.055) 2.713 (2.529)
Mother is self-employed 0.079 (0.055) 1.777 (2.606)
Father is employed 0.096* (0.050) 5.107** (2.484)
Father is self-employed -0.001 (0.063) 0.507 (3.052)
Preschool exists in the community 0.259*** (0.042) 14.229*** (2.698)
Tirana -0.141** (0.065) -4.924 (3.559)
Cost urban 0.033 (0.075) 4.063 (3.446)
Cost rural 0.047 (0.068) 2.889 (3.221)
Central urban 0.167** (0.075) 8.616** (3.424)
Central rural 0.044 (0.065) 2.139 (3.083)
Mountain urban -0.042 (0.068) -1.455 (3.328)
Constant -62.953*** (17.946)
Observations 783 783
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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preschool. Logistical constraints are important, as confirmed by the negative sign
of “distance from nearest school”. Children of educated parents are more likely to
attend school and for more hours, while children living in a household where the
head is female meet with more difficulties19, probably for budgetary reasons. The
major determinant among policy variables is the presence of the service in the com-
munity, confirming that the public supply of preschool facilities is inadequate. The
“left behind” episodes are not significantly related to the difficulties of attending
early-childhood programs. Economic variables seem to be not significant with the
exception of father employment status. This is probably related to the fact that
preschooling is free of charge, even tough there are costs due to inadequacy of sup-
ply and corruption which reduce the equality in accessing the service, limiting the
probability of attendance of poor children. Indeed, long terms wealth indicators are
relevant, as shown by the positive sign of “dwelling ownership” (a proxy of wealth).
Neither the labour force participation of the mother seems not to be a determinant
of the child’s preschool attendance. Preschool facilities have been universal during
the communist period but have dropped drastically during the transition, and some
analyses have argued that the phenomenon is strictly related to the decrease in
female labour force participation. Some others have stressed the responsibility of
the government, which has drastically reduced the share of expenditure allocated
to preschool. Table 4.2 shows that the main constraints are on public policy and
that the mother’s labour status is not a determinant of preschooling choice. In
order to robustly controlling this result, preschool attendance is estimated jointly
with mothers’ participation in the labour market. The results of the bivariate probit
regression (Table 4.3) and the “Likelihood-ratio” test (which yields a “rho” value not
significantly different from zero) shows that the two phenomena are not correlated
(estimating preschooling with a joint model does not change the results of Table 4.2.).
In the equation for the mother’s labour force participation, the negative significance
of the child “left behind” experience may suggest that the phenomenon of male-
dominated migration may have negatively influenced female labour20.
19Preschool enrolment in the sample are only 41,8% of children.
20The result is consistent with the findings of Mendola and Carletto (2008) where the authors
found a negative effect of migration on female paid work and a consequential increase in female
unpaid work
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Table 4.3: Preschool Attendance and Mother’s Labour (Bivariate Probit Model)
Child Attendance Mother Labour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sex -0.073 (0.100) -0.072 (0.126)
Age in months in 2005 0.020*** (0.005) 0.007 (0.006)
Months left behind 0.001 (0.016) -0.022 (0.025)
Time (months) from the last parent’s return 0.009 (0.007) 0.006 (0.009)
HH is muslim 0.134 (0.106) 0.158 (0.139)
Children under 18 in the household 0.042 (0.048) -0.177*** (0.067)
HH number of elder 0.024 (0.069) -0.078 (0.087)
Mother’s education (level) 0.149*** (0.042) 0.321*** (0.047)
Father’s education (level) 0.061 (0.038) 0.043 (0.045)
Female hh head -0.299 (0.220) 0.107 (0.270)
HH social capital (n of groups belongs to) 0.073 (0.076) 0.316*** (0.087)
Log of consumption (no education and child wear) 0.116 (0.106) -0.204 (0.136)
HH has ownership of dwelling 0.290* (0.151) 0.290 (0.187)
Distance from the nearest school -0.030*** (0.005) -0.012* (0.007)
Log of monthly remittances (lek) 0.007 (0.015) -0.033* (0.020)
Log of NE transfer -0.011 (0.017) -0.054** (0.025)
Mother is self-employed 0.201 (0.140) -0.843*** (0.234)
Father is employed 0.251* (0.133) -0.116 (0.167)
Father is self-employed -0.003 (0.164) -0.152 (0.230)
Preschool exists in the community 0.743*** (0.141) -0.290 (0.188)
Tirana -0.388** (0.193) 0.124 (0.224)
Cost urban 0.085 (0.192) 0.177 (0.216)
Cost rural 0.119 (0.175) -0.065 (0.227)
Central urban 0.423** (0.191) 0.063 (0.224)
Central rural 0.113 (0.165) -0.415 (0.264)
Mountain urban -0.113 (0.183) -0.166 (0.230)
Constant -3.435*** (0.960) 0.352 (1.209)
Observations 783 783
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.4.2 Factors influencing drop outs and delays in primary and sec-
ondary school
International migration on the part of the father negatively influences his child’s
schooling in the long run, as suggested by the literature on the effects of parental
absence (see Section 4.1). The results for primary school children and adolescents
(Tables 4.4 and 4.5) show negative and significant coefficients for left-behind dura-
tion. An additional month left behind increases of 0.8% the probability of dropping
out (outcome 0) and of 1% the probability of attending with delay, while it reduces
the probability of in-time enrolment by 1.7%.
For adolescents the impact is higher: an additional month reduces by 16% the
probability of attending secondary school and increases of 15% the probability of not
being enrolled. The negative impact of the phenomenon is reduced if it is far in the
time, as shown by the coefficient of “time since the last return”, whereas the effect
is increased with the length of the migration episode.
These results are reasonable and coherent with the school level attended. Table
4.4 reports the results for compulsory school attendance and Table 4.5 reports the
results concerning secondary school. The control variables present the expected sign:
children are more likely to drop out school when they are older, less likely to drop
out the higher the level of education of their father’s and mother’s, suggesting the
intergenerational transmission of education and the persistence of education inequal-
ity. When the head of the family is female, there is a positive impact in the long
run on children’s success at school, particularly in compulsory school, where bud-
get constraints are less relevant. As suggested by other empirical work (Heckman
and Masterov, 2007; Alderman et al., 2006), having attended preschool has a posi-
tive impact on cognitive development and reduces the risk of drop out or delay for
adolescents. The distance of dwelling from public transport has a strongly negative
impact on the access to education.
Male children are less vulnerable than females to the risk of drooping out dur-
ing primary school. Variables indicating the level of education of parents and the
household’s social capital are always significant and with a large effect in determining
school attendance of both primary and secondary school children. This finding con-
firm the hypothesis that traditional barriers imposed by the patriarchal society may
affect female school participation in spite of the efforts made during the communist
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era to favour female education. This can be explained in terms of the economic model
presented in Section 1.1.3, as the investment on female human capital is lost when
a daughter leaves her natal household at marriage, becoming part of the husband’s
family.
The economic status of the family (dwelling ownership) influences the frequency
of drop-outs as well as employment status of parents21, while logistical constraints
may be a major reason for delays in primary school attendance. The presence of
the school in a particular community is the major element influencing attendance in
Tables 4.4 and 4.5, while family allowances, ceteris paribus, have no influence.
4.4.3 Child expenditure deprivation by age cohort
As far as child deprivation is concerned, no statistically significant influence of
parental absence on the decision to allocate resources in favour of children was found
(Table 4.6). Child poverty in terms of expenditure on goods for children and educa-
tion is mainly influenced by the child’s number of brothers/sisters and by economic
status variables (the welfare and employment status of the father). The household’s
social capital is an important explanatory variable on the probability of not being
deprived fro primary school children while father’s education has a positive influence
on the amount of resources devoted to the adolescent son or daughter.
4.4.4 Duration analysis of school attendance
A Kaplan-Meir estimation of the survival function (Figure 4.1), computed for the
two samples of children who have never been left behind and those who have been,
shows that the probability of survival (remaining in the school system) decreases
substantially with the duration of the spell for those children who have been left, es-
pecially for secondary school. The estimation of the Cox proportional hazard model
(Column (1) of Table 4.7) confirms this result. Being left behind affects the proba-
bility of the child’s leaving school before s/he reaches 18 years old of age. The other
coefficients have almost the same significance levels and signs of the previous model.
Column (3) of Table 4.7 shows the estimates of the parametric frailty model where
21Danaj et al. (2005) reports an average enrollment rates in secondary school of 40% with very
high drop outs rate. Main reasons are limited availability of schools on rural regions and the need
of young people work on family farm.
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Table 4.7: Continuous Time Survival Analysis for School Attendance
Cox Model Parametric Model with Frailty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
coef se coef se
Sex -0.243*** (0.086) -0.369** (0.186)
HH is muslim 0.582*** (0.132) 1.407*** (0.274)
Months left behind while attending school 0.053*** (0.005) 0.224*** (0.054)
Mother’s education (level) -0.463*** (0.069) -0.795*** (0.110)
Father’s education (level) -0.139*** (0.043) -0.362*** (0.082)
Years of preschooling -0.113*** (0.041) -0.238*** (0.086)
Number of hh members 0.023 (0.029) 0.118* (0.065)
Mother has a job -0.089 (0.149) -0.203 (0.278)
Mother is self-employed -0.033 (0.107) -0.216 (0.243)
Father is employed -0.212* (0.117) -0.461* (0.252)
Father is self-employed 0.095 (0.120) 0.165 (0.283)
Female hh head 0.097 (0.178) 0.393 (0.405)
HH has ownership of dwelling -0.151 (0.162) -0.393 (0.354)
Log of consumption (no education and child wear) -0.002 (0.091) -0.130 (0.190)
Log of monthly remittances (lek) 0.011 (0.011) -0.004 (0.024)
Log of NE transfer 0.002 (0.014) 0.024 (0.031)
Primary school exists in the community -0.171 (0.110) -0.790*** (0.276)
Secondary school exists in the community -0.263** (0.128) -0.185 (0.291)
Distance from the nearest school 0.000 (0.003) 0.008 (0.008)
Distance from the nearest bus stop 0.004* (0.002) 0.011* (0.006)
Distance from the nearest doctor -0.002 (0.002) -0.007 (0.007)
Tirana 0.137 (0.201) 0.270 (0.401)
Cost urban -0.011 (0.198) 0.262 (0.394)
Cost rural 0.146 (0.131) 0.534* (0.310)
Central urban -0.171 (0.227) -0.060 (0.446)
Central rural 0.204 (0.134) 0.803** (0.317)
Mountain urban -0.541** (0.244) -0.931** (0.444)
Constant -11.481*** (1.905)
Observations 4129 4129
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.8: Discrete Time Survival Analysis - Time-Varying Variables
Cox Model
(1) (2)
coef se
Sex -0.202** (0.090)
HH is muslim 0.521*** (0.141)
Left behind with lag 0.730** (0.360)
Mother’s education (level) -0.457*** (0.072)
Father’s education (level) -0.208*** (0.045)
Children under 18 in the household -0.020 (0.043)
Number of hh members 0.098*** (0.034)
Female hh head 0.239 (0.387)
Distance from the nearest school 0.005 (0.003)
Distance from the nearest doctor -0.002 (0.003)
Distance from the nearest bus stop 0.007*** (0.002)
Secondary school exists in the community -0.310** (0.133)
Primary school exists in the community -0.040 (0.114)
tirana 0.099 (0.204)
cost urban 0.153 (0.194)
cost rural 0.302** (0.131)
central urban -0.263 (0.234)
central rural 0.085 (0.133)
mountain urban -0.687*** (0.263)
Shock=death of earner 0.336 (0.456)
Shock=job loss 0.375 (0.453)
Shock=househols destroyed 0.754 (0.585)
Shock=pyramide crisis 0.283 (1.017)
Observations 27811
R2 0.0505
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 4.1: The Kaplan-Meier Estimation of Survival in School System
the hazard function takes a Weibull distribution. This estimator allows to control
for unobserved heterogeneity and the likehood-ratio test confirms that heterogeneity
cannot be neglected. The frailty model shows no relevant differences with respect to
the Cox model. Both estimate a greater probability of school drop out due to having
been left behind and to belonging to a Muslim household. A lower probability is
associated with male gender, education of both parents and years of preschooling.
The negative effects of parental migration are also confirmed using the discrete
time Cox model. This model allows to account for the dynamic effects of a time
varying variable, namely, “left behind with lag22”. Table 4.8 shows the discrete time
model with time-varying covariates. Among the time-invariant covariates, as in all
the other estimations, males are less at risk of dropping out than females. Belonging
to a Muslim family or to a big family is related to a higher probability of leaving
school. The episodes of being left behind are still negatively related to school drop
outs controlling for the discrete nature of the collected data. The other time-varying
variables (the micro and macroeconomic shocks) have no significant influence on
dropping out, even though all of them present a positive sign.
22Here the variable “left behind” is constructed in such a way that the effects are continued also
in the year following the left behind episode. This ensures the simultaneity of the episodes “drop
out” and “left behind” when they happen sequentially over time, that otherwise would be lost.
122
The fact that all estimated models lead to similar results, gives more support to
those findings.
4.5 Concluding remarks
Several studies on children’s welfare and migration have emphasized the positive
effects of migration on children’s outcomes deriving from the increase of economic
resources to be invested in the accumulation of human capital. However, the positive
income effects stemming from migrants’ earnings are not without costs especially
in the long run, if children remain without parents for a long time during their
development.
The absence of parents may entail psychological costs and change the decision-
making process within the household, implying a modification of intra-household
duties and responsibilities, and possibly inducing children of migrants to spend less
time in school related activities. Children may end up dropping out of school or being
held back one or more grades due to non-completion or unsatisfactory completion of
their educational formation.
Most of the existing studies assessing the impact of parental migration episodes
on children’s welfare neglect the aspect of children’s residence while one or both
parents are working abroad, mainly because lack of data. The survey data on migra-
tion used in this study allow to reconstruct retrospectively the children’s schooling
status during parental migration and effectively identify the long-run effects of the
phenomenon.
Binary and multiple choice models have been applied to evaluate the decision
to send young children to preschool and school progression of older children and
adolescents. Finally, a duration analysis of school attendance with both discrete
and continuous time models has been performed. All models have made use of
retrospective information about children’s school attendance and age at which they
have been left behind to estimate the hazard function for the risk of dropping out of
school.
The main finding of the analysis is that father’s migration abroad negatively in-
fluences children’s schooling in the long run, increasing the probability of dropping
out and of delaying school progression. For females, the impact is even higher com-
pared to males. The negative impact of the phenomenon tends to become smaller
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the further in time from the actual events the migration episode is, while the effect
increases with the length of the migration episodes.
The variables indicating the level of education of parents and household’s social
capital are relevant at all school levels in increasing the probability of school atten-
dance. The economic status of the family and logistical constraints, like for example
distance from school or from public transports influence the frequency of drop outs
and delays among adolescents. The presence of the school in the community is the
major element influencing attendance to non-compulsory schools (preschool and sec-
ondary school), a fact that could point to the inadequacy of the supply of schools in
Albania. Being “left behind” still has significant positive effects on the probability
of dropping school in a duration analysis that controls for the discrete time nature
of the collected data.
These findings claim for a greater attention to be paid to children of migrant
workers by Albanian public authorities. They should take into account the fact that,
even if migration is an important source of economic growth for the country, there can
be costs associated with the loss of human capital in the long run. The possible loss
of human capital due to parents absence can have serious consequences in terms of
future living standards. Hence, child school attendance should be properly sustained
in those households where one or both parents have migrated abroad with the proper
instruments to compensate for the absence of parental guidance.
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Summary and Conclusions
This thesis has studied the welfare of children in Albania from three points of view: 1)
measures against poverty supplied by the government in terms of monetary benefits;
2) child’s individual welfare considering inequality within the family due to an uneven
intra-household distribution of resources; 3) the possible effects of parental migration
- the most effective strategy in dealing with poverty in the country - on the long-term
development of children as regards school progression.
A short introduction to the theoretical background behind the applied models
and a summary of the main features of Albanian economy are presented before the
three main essays (Chapter I). This chapter has proposed a theoretical foundation
for the use of consumption expenditure as a monetary welfare measure, accounting
for the possibility of having a more precise indicator of individual welfare through
the application of collective consumption models. However, child wellbeing should
not be considered only as monetary, hence, schooling decisions have been modelled
as a long run indicator for child welfare. This analysis is followed by an exposition of
the main socio-economic characteristics of the country under investigation, Albania.
The first essay (Chapter II) has evaluated the effectiveness of the only pro-poor
programme in Albania. Ndihma Ekonomike is one of the earliest poverty reduc-
tion programmes implemented in transitional economies and had a positive record
in terms of targeting during the 1990s, mainly due to its decentralised nature. An
analysis of 2002 and 2005 Albanian LSMS has shown that the targeting performance
of the programme has been weak and to have worsened as compared to the 1990s.
Weak targeting may be explained by various factors including central budget alloca-
tion mechanisms, the design of the targeting methodology, the behaviour of clients
and administrators, and the business cycle. Making use of a regression-adjusted
matching estimator first proposed by Heckman et al. (1998b, 1997), the Ndihma
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Ekonomike average treatment effects have been estimated. The results indicate a
negative and significant effect on household welfare both in 2002 and 2005. Changes
in programme design and the reduction of local administrator’s duties and responsi-
bilities between 2002 and 2005 increased the magnitude of the impact. A comparison
of the cumulative distribution functions of the outcome variables for the treated and
control groups have shown that the control groups invariably dominate the treated
group all along the curves. This may have several possible interpretations. For in-
stance, the reduction of welfare for the families involved in the programme could be
attributable to labour-supply distortions, mainly on female labour supply, usually
more elastic than male’s. Even the small amount provided by the programme could
be enough to discourage female work. The negative effect can also be attributed to
targeting failures and mismanagement, although focusing exclusively on those tar-
geted households which are effectively poor according to the surveys, the impact of
the programme has remained close to zero (2002) or negative (2005). In this first
analysis, the welfare of the family, and in particular the variation induced by an
anti-poverty policy, has been evaluated by treating the family as a unit of analy-
sis, implicitly assuming an equal distribution of the estimated effect among family
members.
Chapter III, instead, explores the possibility of measuring the welfare of children
and the impact of policies accounting for intra-household inequality. To perform this
task, a collective consumption model has been proposed and a collective demand
system has been estimated. Several demographical studies have pointed out the
big changes occurring within Albanian households, deeply affected firstly by the
transition to a regime that revolutionised the previous patriarchal tradition and
secondly by the rapid transition to a market economy and complete openness after
decades of isolation. One of the effects of the transition seems to have been that of
bringing back those traditional values, with a marginal role for women and a general
negligence toward childhood, especially in the northern regions and in rural areas.
This complex situation made it particularly interesting to open the family black box
in order to study individual welfare and evaluate the impact of public policies.
The analysis has been conducted on Albanian households with children under five,
estimating a collective consumption model which results show that intra-household
inequality measured on the share of child expenditure plays an important role in
determining child welfare. Indeed, the Gini index for children increases when child
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welfare is computed using the “sharing rule” method versus the per-capita income
method. Using non-parametric techniques, it is also possible to test whether receiving
public transfers induces a modification of the “sharing rule” with respect to similar
households that do not receive these transfers. A distinction has been made between
cash transfers and in-kind transfers, the former being the NE benefit and the latter
being represented by preschool attendance - which is paid for by the government.
Following the results of these estimations, in-kind transfers are likely to improve the
condition of children within the household for all income levels. However, means
testing cash transfers do not seem to ameliorate the relative position of children,
suggesting that the negative welfare results found in Chapter II for the household as
a whole are also confirmed for children. The conclusions of Chapter III support the
results of Bargain and Donni (2007): in-kind transfers, if properly conceived can be
superior to cash transfer, both because well targeted and because they fulfil precise
needs of vulnerable children.
The model presented in Chapter III has certain limitations, which could be im-
proved with further investigation. The first is that rural Albanian households are
likely to be engaged in household production (farm households). The collective con-
sumption model could have been estimated separately for rural and urban households
if a bigger sample size were available, including household production for rural house-
holds. Secondly, the model treats all adults equally, assuming equality between males
and females. This simplifying assumption is surely significant when gender inequal-
ity is believed to be present, both in developing and developed countries. Thus, a
clear step ahead would be the extension of the model to take into account a more
realistic family composition. This would also require the inclusion of older children
and adolescents in the model, but this strictly relies on the availability of survey’s
information on goods which can be considered exclusive to each age cohort, or to
find a proper specification of the distribution factors in the “sharing rule” to control
for age heterogeneity23.
The last essay focuses on the impact of migration on child wellbeing. While
the positive economic effects of migration on household income are well known, few
studies deal with the qualitative effects of migration on the welfare of children. Hence,
Chapter IV has evaluated the long-term effects of parental migration abroad on the
23Note that this task is not always possible, since a distribution factor can not influence jointly
consumption demand and the distribution of resources.
127
welfare of Albanian children left behind. The phenomenon of children left behind -
mainly by fathers - is very relevant in Albania, where migration has represented the
only viable way of coping with increasing poverty. The data on migration used in this
study have enabled a retrospective reconstruction of the children’s schooling status
during parental migration and the effective identification of the long-run effects of
the phenomenon. Binary and multiple choice models have been used to evaluate
the decision to send young children to preschool, as well as the school progression
of older children and adolescents. Finally, a duration analysis on school attendance
has been performed with both discrete and continuous time models, making use of
retrospective information about children’s school attendance and the age at which
they have been left behind to estimate the hazard of school drop-out.
The main finding of the analysis is that parent’s migration abroad negatively
influences children’s schooling in the long run, increasing the probability of dropping
out and of delaying school progression. For females, the impact is even higher than
that for males. The negative impact of the phenomenon tends to become smaller as
the distance in time between the migration episode and the actual events increases,
while the effect increases with the length of the parental migration episodes. The
variables indicating the level of education of parents and the household social capital
are relevant at all school levels in increasing the probability of school attendance.
The economic status of the family and logistical constraints, such as the distance
from school or the distance from public transportation, significantly influence the
frequency of drop outs and delays among adolescents. The presence of the school
in the community is the major element influencing attendance at non-compulsory
schools (preschool and secondary school), a fact that could point to the inadequacy
of the supply of schools in Albania. Being “left behind” still has a significant positive
impact on the probability of dropping out of school when the duration analysis has
been performed controlling for the discrete-time nature of the collected data. One
of the methodological choices of this study is the decision to distinguish children
by age groups. If Chapter III has focused only on young children, Chapter IV has
studied the welfare of children of three cohorts: children under-five, primary school
age children and adolescents. The different results that have emerged demonstrate
the importance of taking account of this heterogeneity, in terms of both economic
theory and policy design.
Regarding the possible policy recommendations emerging from the findings of
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the analysis on the effects of cash transfers, the first clear fact is that existing safety
nets targeted to vulnerable households and children are not adequate. The natural
conclusions to be drawn from the impact evaluation of Ndihma Ekonomike are that
this cash transfer should be removed and that the expenditure budget share could
be used following two possible strategies. The first is to devote resources to improv-
ing some typically progressive services such as public facilities for young children,
basic education or health services. The second is to implement a new anti-poverty
programme, in the form of a conditional cash transfer or a specific price subside,
aiming at supporting vulnerable individuals within the household, taking into ac-
count intra-household inequality, which has been shown to be an issue during the
Albanian transition from a communist regime to a market economy. In any case, it
is recommended to improve adequacy of supply and quality of public services and to
deal seriously with corruption, which is an huge obstacle to the equity and efficiency
of the public sector in the country.
Another important evidence that has emerged is that migration may have some
undesirable effects on the long run development of the country. Although migration
has been identified as the main driver for the development of Albania during tran-
sition, it is also likely to have had a negative impact on the accumulation of human
capital, the future wellbeing of children and the overall welfare of the country. This
result clearly calls for greater attention to be paid toward children of migrant work-
ers by Albanian public authorities. In fact, there can be costs associated with the
loss of human capital in the long run if school attendance of children is not properly
sustained in those households where one or both parents have migrated abroad.
This study aims to contribute to the existing literature in several ways, both from
a theoretical, a methodological and an empirical point of view. First, Chapter III has
proposed a method of dealing with child poverty by considering the intra-household
allocation of resources. A collective consumption model has been developed to con-
sider children within the household and to compare households with different demo-
graphic compositions. The identification of children’s individual welfare through the
“sharing rule” has made it possible to evaluate the effects of policy on individuals
when no direct information on individual welfare is available, which can be very
important for the policy maker when designing effective policies.
Second, from a methodological point of view, Chapter II has performed the first
application of semi-parametric matching techniques extended with regression ad-
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justment to an anti-poverty program in a developing setting. The analysis is char-
acterised by a faithful modelling of the program screening process and governance,
accounting also for the targeting local performance. Another methodological inno-
vation, developed in Chapter III, has consisted in applying a collective consumption
model for the empirical analysis of child welfare, allowing to identify the sharing rule
using standard household budget data. This approach can be profitably employed in
many countries where the classical collective model based on labour supply cannot
be applied. Finally, Chapter IV has proposed an application of duration models to
the study of the factors influencing school attendance and performance in the long
term. A further element of innovation in this analysis is the full reconstruction of
the historical dynamic relation between the two main variables of interest, school
attendance/progression and parents migration, using cross sectional data.
Third, on the empirical side, Chapter II has contributed to the literature per-
forming one of the first systematic evaluations of social programs in past-communist
transition economies. Chapter III has applied for the first time the collective con-
sumption framework to child poverty and inequality to a transition country. Chapter
IV has assessed for the first time the impact of being “left behind” by emigrated par-
ents taking advantage of retrospective data on schooling and migration.
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